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I. Introduction
The most significant recent trend in real property ownership has
been the dramatic increase in the number of condominiums' and co-
operatives. 2 It has been estimated that one-half of the population of
the United States will be living in condominiums by the year 2000.
3
In addition, a novel form of ownership has grown out of the condo-
minium concept: time-sharing' ownership. Time-sharing generally
involves the division of ownership of a condominium unit into a
number of fixed time periods during which each purchaser has the
exclusive right to use and to occupy that unit.5 In essence the time-
* Ellen Rust Peirce, Assistant Professor, Legal Studies, School of Business Administra-
tion, University of North Carolina. B.A. Bryn Mawr College, 1971; J.D. Duke University
Law School, 1976.
** Richard A. Mann, Professor, Legal Studies, School of Business Administration, Uni-
versity of North Carolina. B.S. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1968; J.D. Yale
University Law School, 1973.
I A property interest in a condominium is defined as a fee simple ownership in a unit of
a multiple unit building and an undivided interest as tenant in common in the common areas
of that building. Annot., 45 A.L.R.3d 1171 (1972).
2 In contrast to a condominium, property interest in a cooperative is defined as interest
in the entity which owns the multiple unit dwelling coupled with a lease providing an indi-
vidual the right to occupy a particular unit. See generally Annot., 77 A.L.R.3d 1290 & n.4
(1977).
3 U.S. DEPT. OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, QUESTIONS ABOUT CONDO-
MINIUMS: WHAT TO ASK BEFORE YOU BUY (Dec. 1977). For a comprehensive analysis of
condominium law, see generally, P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS:
CONDOMINIUM LAW AND PRACTICE (1983); 4B R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, THE LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY (rev. ed. 1981 & Supp. 1983). For ahistory of condominium growth in the United
States, see Note, Expanding Condominiums in Ohio, 29 CASE. W. RES. L. REv. 228, 232 (1978).
4 The term "time-share ownership" is generally used to describe an interest in real estate
pursuant to which several people have exclusive rights to use the property for a given time
period. Eastman, Time-Share Ownership: A Primer, 57 N.D.L. REV. 151, (1981). The term
time-sharing was appropriated from the computer industry. Gray, Pioneering the Concept of
Tne-sharing Ownership, 48 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1196, 1197 (1974). Time-sharing ownership of
real property has been given many different names including interval ownership, fractional
time period ownership (FTPO), and time-sharing ownership (TSO). Roodhouse, Fractional
Time Period Ownership of Recreational Condominiums, 4 REAL EST. LJ. 35 (1975).
5 Note, Tme-Share Condominiums: Property's Fourth Dimension, 32 ME. L. REV. 181 (1980).
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share occupier of a unit owns it in terms of a fixed period of time,
usually a number of weeks per year, and with the other time-share
occupiers shares proportionally in the maintenance and operation
costs of the property. 6 Typically, the minimum purchase require-
ment is one week per year. 7
The application of time-sharing to real estate was first conceived
in Europe in the early 1960's,8 and the idea spread to the United
States real estate market in the 1970's.9 The number of time-share
owners has mushroomed from 17,000 in 1975 to an estimated half
million in 1980, while sales have increased from $50 million to $1
billion in the same period.'0
The rapid increase in time-sharing, particularly as a form of va-
cation home ownership, can be attributed primarily to recent infla-
tion and the attendant overall increase in costs associated with
purchasing a second home." Increased construction and financing
costs have made it prohibitively expensive for many middle income
families to consider purchasing a traditional vacation home or con-
dominium. Demand, however, for recreational housing remains
high, 12 and developers eventually 3 turned to the European model of
time-sharing to provide a less costly solution to the problem. Fur-
6 Conroy, Valuing the Tne-Share Propery, AM. INSTITUTE OF REAL ESTATE APPRAISERS
1(1981).
7 Id.
8 Gunnar, Regulation of Resort Time-Sharing, 57 OR. L. REV. 31, 32 (1978).
9 Id.
10 Hailer, Tps on Time Sharing, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Mar. 16, 1981, at 78.
11 See Gunnar, supra note 8, at 31; Note, New Ideas in the Vacation Home Market, 48 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 1203 (1974).
12 Note, supra note 5, at 182.
13 Initially, in response to the continued demand for vacation properties, developers pro-
moted resort condominiums as investments by coupling them with rental programs. This
form of investment, however, was viewed broadly by states, and the Securities and Exchange
Commission issued Release No. 5347 which set the standard for treating condominiums as
securities.
[T]he offering of condominium units in conjunction with any one of the following
will cause the offering to be viewed as an offering of securities in the form of invest-
ment contracts:
1. The condominiums, with any rental arrangement or other similar service, are
offered and sold with emphasis on the economic benefits to the purchaser to be
derived from the managerial efforts of the promoter, or a third party designated or
arranged for by the promoter, from rental of the units.
2. The offering of participation in a rental pool arrangement; and
3. The offering of a rental or similar arrangement whereby the purchaser must
hold his unit available for rental for any part of the year, must use an exclusive
rental agent or is otherwise materially restricted in his occupancy or rental of his
unit.
See generally, Note, supra note 5, at 182.
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thermore, the buyer may often gain flexibility through exchange pro-
grams offered by some developers and by several independent
exchange networks which allow him to trade occupancy periods with
other time-sharers in different projects located in the same or other
states or countries. 14
With the growth in this new form of property ownership, the
issue of the need for state or federal regulation of these interests has
arisen.' 5 The question of regulation has become critical as a result of
major marketing and legal problems attendant upon the develop-
ment and sale of time-share property. There has been considerable
disagreement *whether the programs should be regulated as real es-
tate (by real estate commission and licensing laws)16 or as securities
(by the Securities and Exchange Commission and state blue sky
laws). 17 Questions have also arisen whether all time-share forms
should be regulated as either real estate or securities, or whether dif-
ferent forms should be regulated differently.
While numerous articles discussing time-sharing have been writ-
ten in the last decade,' none has comprehensively analyzed state-
level legislation specifically regulating time-sharing. This article
traces the evolution of time-sharing, describes the various forms of
time-share arrangements, identifies the problems associated with
time-sharing, outlines the confused regulatory environment, analyzes
the current state legislative approaches to time-sharing regulation,
and makes recommendations regarding the preferred regulatory solu-
tion to time-sharing problems.
II. Forms of Time-Share Offerings
Time-share offerings can be classified as either fee interests
which transfer an ownership interest in the real estate, or as non-fee
interests which transfer only the right to use the property for certain
time periods. Although the actual proportion of fee and non-fee sales
14 Davis, Time-Sharing Exchange Networks, 8 REAL EST. REv. 42 (Fall 1978).
15 See generaly Byrne, Securities Regulation of Time-Sharing Resort Condominiums, 7 REAL EST.
LJ. 3 (1978).
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 See, e.g., Byrne, supra note 15; Davis, Time-Sharing Ownership - Legal and Practical
Problems, 48 ST. JOHNS L. REv. 1183 (1974); Gray, Pioneering the Concept of Time-Sharing Owner-
ship, 48 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1196 (1974); Gunnar, supra note 8; Pollack, Trme-Sharing, or Tne
is Money but WYll It Sell? 10 REAL EsT. LJ. 281 (1982); Varner, Time-Shared Ownership, 12 GA.
ST. B.J. 75 (1976); Note, supra note 11; Comment, Legal Challenges to Timesharing Ownership, 45
Mo. L. REv. 423 (1980).
[Vol. 59:9]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
is not known, it has been estimated to be close to fifty-fifty.19
A. Fee Interests
Fee time-sharing conveys an interest in real property which in-
cludes all of the rights inherent in the ownership of real property,
such as the right to sell, lease, devise, or bequeath the interest. Fee
interests in the property can be established in any of three ways: by
tenancy in common or time-span estate, by interval ownership, or by
fee simple.
1. Time-Span Estate
The time-span estate form of ownership is defined as:
[A] combination of (i) an undivided interest in a present estate in
fee simple in a unit, the magnitude of that interest having been
established by the declaration or by the deed conveying the time
span estate, coupled with (ii) the exclusive right to possession and
occupancy of that unit during a regularly recurring period desig-
nated by that deed or by a recorded document referred to therein.20
A primary function of the time-share declaration is to establish peri-
ods of possession for each of the co-owners of the property. Without
the provisions of the declaration each owner, as a tenant in common,
would have an equal right to possession of the property at all times.21
The declaration further sets forth the rights and duties of each indi-
vidual tenant in common, and more importantly contains an en-
forceable waiver of each co-tenant's right to seek judicial partition.22
Another important function of the declaration is to facilitate financ-
ing of each co-tenant's interest.2 3 Because each co-tenant has sepa-
rately established his period of possession in the declaration, he may
finance his interest without encumbering that of the other co-ten-
ants. 24 The provisions of the declaration when filed with the deed to
19 AMERICAN LAND DEV. Assoc., RESORT TIMESHARING FACT SHEET, Oct. 1981.
20 Uniform Condominium Act § 4-103, reprinted in IA P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, supra
note 3, App. B-6, quoted in Comment, supra note 18, at 426.
21 See R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 633.2 (abr. ed. 1968). See
also Note, supra note 5, at 186.
22 Davis, supra note 18, at 1186. See, e.g., 1 P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, supra note 3, pt. 3,
§ 17C.02[1] (Supplement Declaration § 7). A co-tenant's right to seek judicial partition of
property held by tenancy in common has been granted by statute to co-tenants in every state.
4A R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, supra note 3, §§ 609, 613.
23 See Gray, supra note 4, at 1199. See also Note, supra note 5, at 191.
24 A critical feature of the time span estate is that each owner signs a note covering only
his percentage interest of the unit's mortgage debt. Therefore, he is not liable for the balance
of the mortgage. I P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, supra note 3, pt. 3, § 17C.01A.
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the real property may be enforceable either as convenants running
with the land or as equitable servitudes.25
Use of the time-span estate form of ownership, initially the most
popular form, is waning 6 because of three particular problems: the
possibility of judicial partition;27 the possibility of common liability
in the event of a federal tax lien;28 and the uncertain status of a right
to use which arises not as a direct result of the conveyance, but rather
from the language in the declaration. 29
The statutory right to partition is fundamental to the right of
co-tenants to free themselves from the irritants of a co-ownership of
property which is no longer satisfactory.30 Partition will be effected
by the court upon the request of any co-tenant. 31 It is of critical
importance in time-sharing arrangements that the right to partition
be restrained. Without such a bar, a disgruntled co-owner could
force a partition, which could practicably be effected by only a sale
of the unit and distribution of the proceeds. The time-share scheme,
as a result, would be totally dissolved. Although consensual limita-
tions on the right of partition have been held enforceable, 32 courts
will only enforce the negative convenant if it is limited to a reason-
able period of time.33 The rule against perpetuities34 is generally
used by the courts to determine whether the restraint is reasonable. 35
Virtually all current time-sharing documents contain express
convenants limiting the time-sharer's right to partition.36 Typically,
however, they limit the life of the convenant to the useful life of the
25 Note, supra note 11, at 1216. For a detailed discussion of the enforceability of the
declaration, see Note, supra note 5, at 191-202.
26 Eastman, supra 'note 4, at 153.
27 See Comment, supra note 18, at 432-35.
28 Id. at 428-31.,
29 Davis, Tie Sharing Ownership: Possibilities and Pit/alls, 5 REAL EST. REV. 49, 50 (Win-
ter 1976).
30 4A R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, supra note 3, § 609.
31 See generally 68 CJ.S. Partition § 48 (1950).
32 See 4A R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, supra note 3, § 612-613.
33 "A restraint in the power of a co-tenant to compel partition, created to last for a
reasonable period of time only, is valid." RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 412 (1944). See also
Annot., 37 A.L.R.3d 962, 978 (1971), and cases cited therein.
34 The rule against perpetuities provides that a restraint on the alienation of property
which lasts beyond a life in being plus twenty-one years is void. See RESTATEMENT OF PROP-
ERTY § 173 comment (c) (1936).
35 Id.
36 See 1 P. ROHAN & M. RESkIN,supra note 3, pt. 3, § 17C.02[l], for examples of time-
sharing ownership forms. Some courts have found an implied covenant not to partition if the
sole purpose of the contract would be destroyed without it. See Annot., 37 A.L.R.3d 962, 976
(1971), also cited in Comment, supra note 18, at 434 n.52.
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building, often fifty-five or sixty years.37 In light of limits placed by
the rule against perpetuities on restraints to alienation of property,
including covenants restricting the right to partition, it is not certain
that such a limitation would be lawful.38 To date, no case has been
brought to test the validity of these convenants. 39 Although states
with condominium acts have restricted co-owners' rights to partition
for as long as the property remains a statutory condominium, 40 these
restrictions do not extend to units owned pursuant to a time-sharing
scheme. 41 Moreover, even though a number of states42 have adopted
statutes expressly regulating time-share ownership and addressing
the problem of partition, the majority have not. In these latter states,
the risk of judicial partition can be a major concern to time-share
owners.
43
A second problem with the tenancy in common or time-span
estate form of time-sharing is the possibility that the federal govern-
ment will take the unit for non-payment of taxes44 by one of the ten-
ants in common. 45  The Internal Revenue Code authorizes the
attorney general or his delegate to bring an action in federal court
"to enforce the [tax] lien. . . or to subject any property, of whatever
nature, of the delinquent, or in which he has any right, title or inter-
est, to the payment of such tax or liability. '46 Pursuant to this sec-
37 1 P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN,supra note 3, pt. 3, § 17C.02[l].
38 Although the rule against perpetuities does not apply directly to restraints upon parti-
tions, it has been applied to them by analogy. See 6 R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, supra note 3,
§ 846 at 30.
39 Most courts have taken a liberal attitude toward the reasonableness of the duration of
partition agreements in contexts other than time-sharing. For examples of decisions uphold-
ing agreements not to partition, see Comment, supra note 18, at 434 n.54.
40 See Note, supra note 5, at 190.
41 Typically, state condominium statutes prohibit partition of "common elements" of
which a unit, by definition, is not one. Id. at 190 n.57.
42 To date, Florida, Hawaii, Nebraska, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia have
enacted specific legislation dealing with time sharing. See notes 226-468 infra and accompa-
nying text for a detailed discussion of these statutes.
43 For a discussion of the enforcement against successors and assigns of a covenant not to
partition, see Comment, supra note 5, at 191-201; see also Comment, supra note 18, at 435.
44 Section 6321 of the Internal Revenue Code provides: "If any person liable to pay any
tax neglects or refuses to pay the same after demand, the amount shall be a. . . lien in favor
of the United States upon all the property and rights to property, whether real or personal,
belonging to such person." I.R.C. § 6321 (1976).
45 This problem arises only in connection with time-share estate ownership and not, with
interval estate ownership. In the latter form of ownership, each user is an owner in severalty
only for his particular term of ownership and holds no ownership interest during the rest of
the year. Hence, his interest is not subject to sale for the tax delinquency of a co-tenant. See
Comment, supra note 18, at 428 n.21.
46 I.R.C. § 7403(a) (1976). If the federal district court orders a sale pursuant to this
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tion, the government may have the right to sell the interests of all the
co-tenants in the unit to satisfy the tax liability of one of them.47 Not
only are the non-delinquent co-tenants subjected to a forced sale of
their interests in the time-share condominium, but they are also sub-
jected as necessary parties to the nuisance of a court appearance. 48
The courts of appeals disagree as to whether section 7403 autho-
rizes the government to sell the entire property held jointly with
others in which the delinquent taxpayer has an interest or only the
delinquent taxpayer's interest. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit was the first to address this issue. In a 1962 decision, Folsum v.
United States,49 the court held that the government did not have the
right to force the sale of other joint owners' property.50 While the
Tenth Circuit shares this view,5' the majority of the courts of appeals
which have addressed this issue hold to the contrary.52 The leading
decision in this area is United States v. Tilling,53 in which the court
held, after examining the congressional intent of section 7403, that
"[t]he express language of the statute negates any design or intent on
the part of Congress to limit the reach of the statute to the 'interest'
of the taxpayer as distinguished from the 'property' in which he has
such 'interest.' ")54
While the majority of these circuit courts held that section 7403
allows the government to sell the entire property to satisfy one co-
tenant's tax delinquency, each decision to date has involved owner-
section, the proceeds will be distributed "according to the findings of the court in respect to
the 'interests of the parties and of the United States." Id § 7403(c).
47 Id.
48 I.R.C. § 7403(b) (1976) provides that "[a]ll persons having ... or claiming any inter-
est in the property involved in such action [to enforce the tax lien] shall be made parties
thereto."
49 306 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1962).
50 The court stated in its decision that while the United States could "obtain the last
vestige of title and every right which such taxpayer owns. . ., [t]he law does not authorize
... [i]t to force a sale of the property of other joint owners, deny them the right to seek a
partition in kind, and to tax them with the costs incurred by the Government in pursuing the
delinquent taxpayer." Id. at 367.
51 United States v. Hershberger, 475 F.2d 677 (10th Cir. 1973) (A wife's interest in a
homestead should not be sold in its entirety to pay a federal tax lien.).
52 See, e.g., United States v. Kocher, 468 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1972) (sale of tenancy in
common property to satisfy one tenant's tax lien); United States v. Overman, 424 F.2d 1142
(9th Cir. 1970) (sale of community property to satisfy husband's tax lien); Washington v.
United States, 402 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1968) (sale of wife's inchoate dower interest to satisfy lien
of husband); United States v. Trilling, 338 F.2d 699 (7th Cir. 1964) (sale of jointly held real
estate to satisfy lien of husband).
53 328 F.2d 699 (7th Cir. 1964).
54 Id. at 703.
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ship by a husband and wife.55 Typically the owners of time-sharing
interests in a condominium would not involve such a relationship.
One author speculates that a court might, in considering the equities
involved, decide to authorize the sale of only the delinquent tax-
payer's interest and not the entire property.56 This speculation is not
entirely without foundation. A 1974 decision of the Tenth Circuit,
United States v. Eaves,57 held that while section 7403 does authorize
the sale of property jointly held in order to satisfy a tax lien of one of
the co-tenants, the statute does not make "foreclosure an 'all or noth-
ing' proposition. " 58 Thus the Tenth Circuit at least suggests that eq-
uitable considerations may apply in appropriate situations and
prevent a sale of the entire property. Several other decisions, al-
though none recently, have applied equitable considerations in ad-
dressing the issue of the sale of property to satisfy tax liens.59
Although the possibility of a federal tax foreclosure sale is real,
such an occurrence is unlikely as the majority of cases do not progress
to that stage.60 Similarly, while a state could theoretically attach a
lien to a time-share unit and effect the sale of the entire property to
satisfy the debt of one of the co-tenants, this too is unlikely.6'
A third problem of time-span ownership interests is a practical
one: how to insure that each owner will obtain occupancy and use of
his interest in the unit during his appointed time period.62 This
problem arises because the right is not created directly by the con-
veyance, but instead derives from the language in the declaration.
Thus a title policy that insures the ownership of the undivided inter-
est may not automatically insure the right to use. Because the right
to use is of greater practical importance to the owner than the under-
lying ownership interest, it is essential that he obtain a provision con-
cerning the right to use in the title insurance policy issued with the
property.63
55 See note 52 supra.
56 See Comment, supra note 18, at 431.
57 499 F.2d 869 (10th Cir. 1974).
58 Id. at 871.
59 See, e.g., United States v. Boyd, 246 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1957) (court not required to use
tax lien foreclosure as a remedy); United States v. Overman, 424 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1970)
(court to act in a flexible manner); United States v. Hershberger, 475 F.2d 677 (10th Cir.
1973) (application of equitable considerations). Also cited in Comment, supra note 18, at 431
n.38.
60 See W. PLUMB, FEDERAL TAx LIENS 3 (3d ed. 1972).
61 For a brief discussion of the problem of foreclosure sales pursuant to a state tax lien,
see Comment, supra note 18, at 428 n.22.
62 See Davis, supra note 29, at 50.
63 Id.
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2. Interval Ownership
The second kind of fee interest in a time-sharing unit is that
created by interval ownership. In contrast to the time-span estate,64
the interval estate is defined as:
[A] combination of (i) an estate for years in a unit, during the term
of which title to a unit rotates among the time-share owners thereof,
vesting in each of them in turn for periods established by a fixed
recorded schedule, with the series thus established recurring regu-
larly until the term expires, coupled with (ii) a vested undivided fee
simple interest in the remainder in that unit, the magnitude of that
interest having been established by the declaration or by the deed
creating the interval estate.65
This form of time-share ownership is structured as an estate for
years, 66 typically consisting of a two week period, 67 which recurs an-
nually for a set number of years. 68 At the same time that the pur-
chaser is granted the estate for years, he also acquires a remainder6 9
in fee simple as a tenant in common with the other purchasers, to
take effect at the termination of the estate for years. This concept
differs from the time-span ownership in that title and the right to
occupancy are created simultaneously by the same deed20 No sepa-
rate declaration, lease, or contract is necessary to establish the right
to occupancy. The interval purchaser receives exclusive fee title for
the period he is entitled to possession,7' in contrast to the time-span
purchaser whose right of possession arises only pursuant to a
convenant.
Although this type of fee interest also has potential problems, 72
it does eliminate some of the problems associated with time-span in-
64 See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
65 Uniform Condominium Act § 4-103, reprinted in IA P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, supra
note 3, App. B-6.
66 An estate for years is one whose duration is defined in units of a year or any fraction or
multiple thereof. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 19 (1936).
67 Note, supra note 5, at 201. The developer may choose any time period; however,-peri-
ods of less than two weeks are not considered practical because of operational costs. Id. at
n.134.
68 The specified number of years usually corresponds to the estimated useful life of the
building. Comment, supra note 18, at 427.
69 For a full discussion of the remainder interest and its implications, see Note, supra note
5, at 204 nn.151-62. The vested remainder interest was added to the estate for years in order
to avoid any possible violation of the rule against perpetuities. See Davis, supra note 14, at 51.
70 Davis,supra note 18, at 1187. The deed creates the recurring estate for years and then
conveys the remainder over as tenants in common at a specified future date.
71 1 P. ROHAN &M. RESKIN, supra note 3, § 17C.01A, citedin Note, supra note 5, at 202.
72 See notes 79-94 infia and accompanying text.
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terests. In interval ownership time-share plans, the tax lien 73 and
partition74 issues connected with time-span ownership do not arise
during the initial period of tenancy for years. Each of the grantees of
the interval time periods has a divided direct interest in his time slot,
and his right to use is established simultaneously with and as a part
of the conveyance. 75 This arrangement alleviates the necessity not
only for title insurance 76 to protect a purchaser's time-span owner-
ship and use rights, but also for a convenant against partition.
At the end of the estate for years, however, the same concerns
that exist with time-span ownership arise when the owners become
tenants in common. Threats of partition or the forced sale of the
property for federal tax purposes, though, are substantially mitigated
by the fact that the price paid for the individual time period has
already been amortized over the useful life of the building. 77 Indeed,
one author has suggested that "these attributes of tenancy in com-
mon that come into being after the expected period of use very likely
are an advantage to the interval method of conveyance. '78
Nonetheless, this method of conveying a time-share estate is not
free from potential drawbacks. First, the owner's interest in the es-
tate for years may be looked upon as a lease between the developer
and the time-share purchasers. 79 Second, a merger may occur where
the estate for years, the lesser estate, merges with the greater estate,
the fee simple absolute.80 Third, a partition may take place, al-
though the ramifications of partition in an interval estate are not as
severe as in a time-span estate.81
The first drawback, that of treating an interval estate as a lease,
potentially arises because of the mutuality between the estate for
73 See notes 44-61 supra and accompanying text.
74 See notes 30-43 supra and accompanying text.
75 1 P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, supra note 3, pt. 3, § 17C.O1A, also cited in Davis, supra note
18, at 51.
76 See text accompanying note 63 supra.
77 Davis, supra note 18, at 1185-87.
78 Id. The right to force a sale of the property is a critical one. Once the vacation condo-
minium building surpasses its useful life, each owner's proportional interest in the property
will, individually, have very little value and may be difficult to sell. In contrast, the property
as a whole will have acquired more value. By forcing the sale of the building, the individual
owner will enjoy a greater profit from his individual interest than he would if he had tried to
sell it separately.
79 See Varner, supra note 18, at 76-77; Note, supra note 5, at 202-07.
80 See Note, supra note 5, at 207-10.
81 See note 94 infra and accompanying text.
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years and the landlord-tenant relationship.8 2 The estate for years has
specifically been defined as a lease for a finite period of time 3 and
has been regarded as "presenting the typical case of the relation of
landlord and tenant. ' 84 Although it has been argued that the estate
for years does not establish a landlord-tenant relationship, 5 an in-
terval estate so considered would be subject to landlord-tenant
law.86 The possibility of such an interpretation, however, may be
reduced where the developer conveys a fee simple remainder to inter-
val purchasers.8 7 Furthermore, the developer's conveyance of the re-
mainder relieves him from the liability entailed by ownership of the
cleaning periods.
One commentator88 has suggested that the interval estate may
be subject to the common law principle of merger.89 The estate for
years is deemed to represent a lesser interest in property than the fee
simple absolute, which the interval owners hold as tenants in com-
mon. Where the lesser and greater estates are held by the same par-
ties, the lesser estate is by law extinguished ° Thus the estate for
years would be extinguished by the fee simple absolute. Because the
estate for years is the vehicle which establishes the interval owners'
right to possession, if it were merged in the fee simple, the time-shar-
ing aspect of the interval estate would disappear.91 However, a ma-
jority of courts today no longer apply the legal doctrine of merger,
but instead apply equitable principles under which they "will not
82 1 H. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 76 (3d ed. 1939); 1 AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY §§ 3.2, 3.13 (AJ. Casner, ed. 1952 & Supp. 1977).
83 3 G. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 1017
(repl. 1980).
84 1 H. TIFFANY, supra note 82.
85 See Note, supra note 5, at 202-03 & n.142.
86 Id. at 203.
87 Prior to enactment of the statute of uses, an estate for years could not support a re-
mainder interest because the estate for years was not considered a freehold estate. With the
passage of the statute of uses, the importance of seisin waned, and a fee simple interest subject
to an estate for years became known as a remainder. However, the remainder attendant to an
estate for years is not the same at that following a freehold estate. See Note, supra note 5, at
206-07. See also 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 82, § 4.31; T. BERGIN & P.
HASKELL, PREFACE TO ESTATES IN LAND AND FUTURE INTERESTS 108 (1966); L. SimEs &
A. SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 116 (1956).
88 See Note, supra note 5, at 207-10.
89 The common law principle of merger is defined as follows: "Whenever a greater estate
and a less coincide and meet in one and the same person without any intermediate estate, the
less is immediately annihilated; or in the law phrase, is said to be merged, that is sunk or
drowned in the greater." Note, supra note 5, at 207, citing 2 W. BLACKSTONE COMMENTA-
RIES 177 (Wendell, ed.); accord 9 G. THOMPSON, supra note 83, § 4798.
90 See 1 H. TIFFANY, supra note 82, § 151.
91 See Note, supra note 5, at 207-08.
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compel a merger of estates where the party in whom the two interests
are vested does not intend such a merger to take place. ' 92 A sug-
gested solution to the possibility of unwanted merger of the two es-
tates is to create both the estate for years and the remainder in the
same instrument 93 and to specify in the conveyance documents the
parties' intent that no merger take place.
The specter of partition also arises with the interval estate, al-
though the consequences are not as severe as with the time-span es-
tate. Unless the two have already been merged, a partition of the fee
simple estate does not have any effect on the estate for years, 94 which
gives the interval owner his possessory interest. Nevertheless, it is
prudent that the time-sharing declaration contain a waiver of the
right of partition.
3. Fee Simple
A third method of creating a fee interest in a time-sharing unit,
the conveyance of a fee simple estate to each purchaser, has been
proposed by two authors.95 But this method has had little, if any,
practical application, probably because it defies conventional prop-
erty law concepts. Traditionally, a conveyance in fee simple gives to
the purchaser all conceivable initerests in the property.96 However,
conveying a fee simple interest in time-share property adds a novel
conveyable dimension to the property, that of time.97 Thus the fee
simple approach would require a revision of conventional property
law concepts which look at a property interest as containing only
three dimensions-breadth, depth, and height. 98
The principle behind the conveyance of a fee simple time-share
interest is fundamentally different from the time-span and interval
ownership conveyances in that the purchaser is not a joint owner of
the property conveyed, but rather the sole owner. Because his prop-
erty is temporally defined, "his possessory right exists only during the
times conveyed and by definition does not exist at any other time."99
No separate instrument or declaration is needed to create the time-
92 See Note, supra note 5, at 208 n.173 and cases cited therein.
93 Id. at 209.
94 Id. at 210.
95 Outen, Latter Day Tine-Sharing, LAw TITLE NEWS, July-Aug. 1974; Roodhouse, Frac-
tional Time Period Ownership of Recreational Condominiums, 4 REAL EST. L.J. 35 (1975).
96 1 H. TIFFANY, supra note 82, § 27. See also 4 G. THOMPSON, supra note 83, § 1847.
97 Roodhouse, supra note 95, at 48-49.
98 Id. at 49; 1 H. TIFFANY, supra note 82, § 27. See also Note, supra note 5, at 211 n.189.
99 Note, supra note 5, 213 n.203.
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share interest. A declaration, however, is still necessary to establish
the rights and duties of the owners among themselves. 00
This method of ownership has several advantages. Because this
type of conveyance passes a fee simple interest entirely distinct from
the interests of the units' other fee simple owners, individual financ-
ing is facilitated. 10 Furthermore, each time-share purchaser is the
owner of his property as it is temporally defined and receives all the
benefits of fee ownership. 0 2 Moreover, this type of conveyance mini-
mizes the possibility of joint tort liability among the unit owners, a
concern which arises in time-span and interval forms of ownership. 03
On the other hand, there are also distinct disadvantages to fee
simple time-share ownership. A major shortcoming is that the right
to partition or judicial sale at the end of the project's useful life' 0 4 is
unavailable in this form of ownership. Thus property purchased in
this fashion may decrease in value and be difficult to sell as the unit
nears the end of its useful life.'0 5 A second problem is that posed by
ownership of the cleaning periods. 0 6 If these periods are retained by
the developer, he is exposed to potential tort and tax liabilities associ-
ated with ownership of the property. If they are conveyed to the
purchasers as tenants in common, one of the benefits of the fee simple
purchase will be thwarted, as all owners may be held jointly liable
for such obligations. One author suggests that an effective way to
circumvent this problem is for the developer to convey an equal
number of cleaning days in fee simple to each of the purchasers. 10 7
This conveyance could be tied to a lease allowing the management to
enter the premises for maintenance during the cleaning days. Such
an arrangement would serve the interests of both developer and pur-
chasers, allowing the developer to avoid liability from ownership of
100 However, this document would differ from that used for the two other approaches in
that it would not set forth the possessory rights of the purchasers. The declaration would
typically cover issues of the responsibility of each owner for common expenses, tort liabilities
to person and property, and other issues generally dealt with in the declarations in the time
span and interval arrangements. See, e.g., 1 P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, supra note 3, pt. 3,
§ 17C.02[1].
101 See Note, supra note 5, at 214.
102 Id. at 213-14.
103 Id. at 214.
104 Even though time span and interval owners have waived their right to such a parti-
tion, this waiver only extends for a reasonable time, usually the expected useful life of the
building. Thus these time-share owners may compel a partition sale of the entire building at
the expiration of the given time period. See notes 36-43 and 94 supra and accompanying text.
105 See note 78 supra.
106 Note, supra note 5, at 216.
107 Id.
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the property and the time-share purchasers to avoid joint liability. 10
Despite their differences, all three of the fee time-share owner-
ship arrangements share certain advantages. First, the time-share
owner will benefit from any appreciation in the value of his inter-
est. 109 Second, because the time-share interest is a real estate interest,
federal income tax deductions may be taken for the pro rata real
estate tax expense included in the annual maintenance fee, as well as
for interest paid in connection with financing the time-share
purchase.
4. Tort Liability
At the same time, fee ownership involves certain common disad-
vantages. Tort liability is problematic with all three forms of fee
ownership of time-share estates. Fee time-share owners may be ex-
posed to three areas of tort liability: for injury or damage due to
negligent maintenance of the common areas, for damage to the unit
which an owner causes while he is in possession,110 and to third par-
ties injured on the co-owned premises while another co-owner is in
possession. I II
Fee ownership of a time share estate encompasses two different
kinds of property: the individual unit, which is owned severally by
the time share estate owners; and the common areas of the building,
which are owned in turn by all the time-share estate owners. Gener-
ally, the common areas are maintained by a condominium associa-
tion to which all owners belong. Membership in this association
creates possible liability for the time-share owners for injuries sus-
tained in the common areas. Several authors '1 2 have suggested in-
corporation of the association or liability insurance as solutions.
These measures should reduce, if not eliminate, the owners' exposure
to liability for torts occuring in the common areas.
108 The time-share purchaser is still liable for debts in connection with ownership of those
cleaning days when he is not in possession. This potential liability, however, is evenly distrib-
uted among all the purchasers and can be taken care of by liability insurance. Id.
109 Conroy, supra note 6, at 8.
110 Comment, supra note 18, at 436.
111 Id. This type of liability is not possible among interval owners because each has a
defeasible fee in his unit during his occupancy to the exclusion of all other interval owners,
who likewise obtain exclusive title when they occupy the unit. Thus, the negligence of one
owner may not be imputed to another. Id. at 437.
112 See Jackson, Why You Should Incorporate a Homeowners Association, 3 REAL EST. L.J. 311
(1975); Knight, Incorporation of Condominium Common Areas? An Alternative, 50 N.C.L. REV. 1
(1971); Note, Condominium Casualty and Liability Insurance, 48 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1112 (1974);
Note, Condominiums: Incorporation of the Common Element-A Proposal, 23 VAND. L. REV. 321
(1970).
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The second possible area for tort liability of time-share owners is
unique to this form of property ownership. Because there are many
time-share owners of each unit, they have a shared responsibility for
its upkeep. If a unit is damaged, it would seem appropriate to assess
the time-share owner who actually did the damage rather than all of
them. However, it may be difficult to determine which owner was
responsible because of the quick turnover of occupancy. Many time-
share resorts today resolve this issue by allowing the managing agent
to decide who is liable for the repairs. 13 The rationale for this is that
he oversees the clean-up between occupancies and therefore can most
readily ascertain which owner was responsible for the damage. As
one author has noted, this solution is not without problems:
In essence, an owner's consent to a determination of this type con-
stitutes a waiver of the common law right to a jury trial on the
issue. Such a system would be acceptable only in cases exclusively
involving property damage and not personal injury. In addition, it
is essential that the managing agent's cursory determination not
possess evidentiary value in an ancillary tort action by one claiming
injury as a result of the owner's conduct. Finally, the scope of de-
termination of negligence should be limited to the sole issue of who
is to pay for repair of the damaged unit. This is, after all, the only
issue which is of importance to all co-owners. 114
The third possible area of liability applies in particular to time-
span estate owners. They run the risk of joint liability for injury to a
third party occurring not in the common area, but rather in the unit
itself, as a result of one co-owner's negligence. 15
B. Non-Fee Interests
In contrast to fee time-sharing, non-fee time-sharing arrange-
ments convey no legal title to the property but only those rights spe-
cifically granted by the developer. Typically, these are the rights to
use a time-share unit and the related premises. 1 6 The three princi-
pal non-fee forms of time-sharing are the vacation license, vacation
lease, and club membership."17
1. Vacation License
The vacation license, the oldest form of time-sharing in the
113 1 P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, supra note 3, pt. 3, § 17C.02[1].
114 Comment, supra note 18, at 439.
115 See note I IIsupra.
116 Conroy, supra note 6, at 9.
117 Pollack, supra note 18, at 285; Davis, supra note 29, at 52.
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United States,"" is a right to use. 119 It establishes the purchaser's
right to use a given unit during a specified period of time each year
for either a term of years or the useful life of the building. 120 The fee
interest remains with the developer or sales firm. 121 The license was
developed primarily as a mechanism to avoid real estate regulatory
agencies and the necessity of using licensed real estate salesmen. 122
The vacation license is created by a simple agreement between the
purchaser and the developer 123 and may obviate the need to comply
with federal, state, or local land sales rules. 124 Since the vacation
license is generally not considered an interest in real estate, 125 its sale
is not subject to the same requirements as the time span, interval, or
fee estate, which all involve the sale of an interest in real property.
All of the putative advantages of the vacation license time-share
arrangement rest on the premise that the interest purchased is not an
interest in real property. As one author has pointed out, this becomes
a question of "substance over form."' 126 Another author has sug-
gested that the real issue is the intent of the parties, and if the offeror
118 Davis, supra note 29, at 52.
119 Powell defines a license as "a privilege in A to use land possessed by B, so long as B
fails to cancel the privilege. . . .[I]ts duration is at the will of the servient owner." R. POW-
ELL & P. ROHAN, supra note 21, § 428. The Uniform Real Estate Time-Share Act defines a
time-share license as a "right to occupy a unit or any of several units during [51 or more
separated time periods over a period of at least [5] years, including renewal options, not cou-
pled with a freehold estate or an estate for years." UNIFORM REAL ESTATE TIME-SHARE
ACT § 1-102(18), 7A U.L.A. 259, 263 (1979 & Supp. 1983).
120 COUNCIL OF THE LAND DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION, RESORT TIMESHARING: A
CONSUMER GuIDE 5 (1977).
121 Davis, supra note 18, at 1184.
122 Id.
123 In most states the license is not considered a real property interest: "the courts have
regarded a license as carrying with it no property interest . ..which the law will recognize
and protect." Walsh, License and Finances for Years, 19 N.Y.U.L. REV%-. 333, 340 (1942). How-
ever, an authority on real estate has defined the license as an interest in land, if not a substan-
tial one:
Such a revocable privilege is an "interest in land" as that term has been defined in
Section 5 of the Restatement of Property. . . .This does not mean. . .that the rev-
ocable privilege should be treated as a substantial interest in land. . . .The evanes-
cent, fleeting, revocable character of the interest justifies a denial of treatments
accorded to more substantial interests in land but does not justify a denial of its
character as an interest in land, while it lasts. So long as it continues, a license
derogates from the completeness of the servient owner's ownership and this requires
its recognition as an "interest in land."
R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, supra note 21, § 428, also cited in Davis, supra note 18. at 1184.
124 Davis. supra note 29, at 51. For a discussion of the details in a vacation license, see
Note, supra note 11, at 1212.
125 Davis, supra note 18, at 1184.
126 Id. at 1185.
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has characterized the plan as a license then such a declaration in the
instrument should be sufficient to avoid creating a real estate
interest. 127
A potential drawback of the vacation license is that it may be
deemed a security, necessitating registration with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC).128 In an attempt to preclude this pos-
sibility, some developers place restrictions on resale at a profit in
their licenses.129 Some developers further limit a licensee's right to
alienate his interest by stipulating that he may not rent his time pe-
riod to a third party 30 or enter into sublicense agreements.13' The
license form of time-share arrangement, however, is less likely to be
deemed a security than the other forms of time-share interests since
the vacation licensee does not participate in profits earned by the
developer. 3 2
Another disadvantage is the licensee's lack of control over the
developer's actions because he does not own the underlying fee.
Moreover, the developer may encumber the property and thereby
subject it to liens placed by his creditors.' 33
2. Vacation Lease
The primary distinction between the vacation license and the
vacation lease is that, in the latter case, the developer is selling an
interest in real property.
The lease is exactly what it seems. The purchaser acquires a lease
of a particular piece of real property for a given period each year.
The lease extends for a specified time period. The instrument is
entered into between the developer as landlord and the purchaser
as tenant. All of the rights and obligations of both parties are set
forth within the instrument itself.' 34
One method of establishing a time-share lease is to provide for trans-
fer to the purchaser of an undivided leasehold interest in an identi-
127 Note, supra note ll. at 1214.
128 For a full discussion of the regulation of time share interests as a security, see notes
169-96 infra and accompanying text.
129 Davis, supra note 18, at 1185.
130 A licensee may, however, transfer his interest by gift or bequest. Note, supra note 11, at
1213.
131 Id.
132 See notes 175-88 inra and accompanying text for the definition of a security.
133 One author notes, however, that a title company would look upon the license as a
cloud upon the title, thereby rendering the property potentially unmarketable. See Davis,
supra note 18, at 1185.
134 See Davis, supra note 29, at 52.
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fled unit for a designated two week period to last forever.1 35
Pursuant to the scheme, each lessee is obligated to pay both an an-
nual fee to a party designated by the developer to manage the project
and a pro rata share of the expenses.1 36 This arrangement again
raises the possibility of SEC regulation. However, the SEC has is-
sued at least one no action letter concerning this type of time-share
arrangement because the purchaser did not participate in income-
producing aspects of the arrangement. 37
In a variation on the vacation lease, multiple buyers may
purchase a unit, each receiving a fee title to a particular time period,
and each then executing a leaseback agreement whereby the devel-
oper agrees to pay a fixed annual amount in addition to supervising
the unit's operation.' 38 The purchaser receives the right to use the
unit and the obligation to pay his share of the common expenses.
Although the SEC has issued a no-action letter for one such time-
share arrangement, 39 a similar transaction with a slight modification
was deemed a security by the SEC. 40
The vacation lease has two distinct advantages for the purchaser
over the vacation license. He may record it under state recording
statutes, and may obtain title insurance for the lease.14'
3. Club Membership
Club membership is the least important of the three forms of
non-fee interests in time-sharing. Generally, one purchases a mem-
bership for a specified number of years in a club or association which
owns, leases, or operates the time-share premises. 42 Alternatively,
the club membership undertaking may consist of a non-profit corpo-
135 Whether this arrangement in fact creates a leasehold interest is subject to debate since
the duration of the leasehold interest is uncertain. 2 R. POWELL & P. RoHAN, supra note 21,
§ 222.3.
136 Note, supra note 11, at 1214.
137 See Kona Billfisher, Sec. Reg. Guide (P-H) § 1100.150, at 1098.31 (1974).
138 Note, supra note 11, at 1214.
139 See Sale of Spanish Rental Units Can Proceed Without '33 Act Registration [July-
Dec.] Sec. Reg & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 211, at C-3 (July 18, 1973).
140 The SEC issued a no action letter to a developer of a sale-leaseback arrangement,
noting in particular that rental services were not involved in the scheme and that there were
no representations that the purchaser might gain economic benefits by subleasing. In con-
trast, the SEC held that an arrangement which included a rental brokerage service both to
cover maintenance costs and to reduce the principal of the mortgage debt was a security. See
Edward S. Jaffry, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 78.395, at 80,881
(1971).
141 See Davis, supra note 29, at 52.
142 See Conroy, supra note 6, at 9.
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ration specifically established for the purpose of providing time-
shares to its members. 143 One advantage to the club membership
form is that the time-share interest purchased may be for a number
of resorts. The rights and obligations of the developer and the mem-
ber are set forth in the associaton's articles and by-laws and in the
membership agreement between the developer (on behalf of the asso-
ciation) and the member. The condominium units may be owned
either by the association or by the developer, in which case they are
leased to the association.144
C. Summary
Very distinct benefits and consequences derive from the two
fundamental forms of time-share ownership-fee and non-fee. An
obvious advantage of non-fee time ownership is the right to use with-
out the underlying responsibility of ownership. Since the time period
of the right to use is typically equal to or less than the economic life
of the building, non-fee time-share purchasers need not bear the bur-
den of final disposition or rehabilitation of the property as it nears
the end of its economic life.1 4 5 Non-fee time-share owners may de-
duct interest paid on the financed portion of the purchase price from
their federal income tax,146 but clearly pay no property tax on the
property. Another advantage to non-fee owners is that the developer
who has retained ownership in the premises has a strong incentive to
maintain the property in peak condition. However, there are some
decided drawbacks to this form of time-share ownership. 147 Without
the ownership of the underlying fee, an owner cannot take deduc-
tions for real estate and personal property taxes.1 48 Typically, in or-
der to have a non-fee time-share offering avoid the appearance of a
security offering, there must be restrictions in the sales contract upon
the purchaser's right of resale.149 Such restrictions forbid purchasers
'from reselling their interest at a profit.15 0 Furthermore, the owner is
not usually allowed to rent out his time-share to anyone else. 131
143 See Davis, supra note 29, at 53.
144 Id.
145 See Conroy, supra note 6, at 10.
146 Id. Of course, this advantage is also enjoyed by fee owners.
147 Id.
148 See Pollack, supra note 18, at 286.
149 See Conroy, supra note 6, at 10. This drawback also applies to fee time-share interests.
See Eastman, supra note 4, at 158.
150 See Conroy, supra note 6, at 10.
151 However, subleasing is generally permissible with a vacation lease. See Pollack, supra
note 18, at 286.
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On the other hand, there are several benefits associated with fee
ownership of a time-share interest that are not enjoyed by non-fee
owners. Primary among these is the free right of alienation. A fee
owner is entitled to sell, devise, donate, or rent his interest as he
chooses. In addition, fee ownership entails the right to mortgage the
property interest, 152 deduct the interest on income tax returns, and
take deductions for real estate and personal property taxes. At the
same time, there are certain burdens associated with fee ownership.
Although the fee simple conveyance reduces the risk of joint tort lia-
bility among unit owners, such liability is a real concern for both
time-span and interval owners.' 53 Other burdens 54 include responsi-
bility for ever increasing property taxes; assumption of a share of the
operating, maintenance, and refurbishing costs; 155 and the ultimate
burden of disposing of the property at the end of its economic life. '1 56
Finally, sales of fee interests, like their counterpart non-fee interests,
unless properly structured, may be deemed securities offerings. 157
It is virtually impossible for a prospective time-share purchaser
to be aware, or even to apprise himself, of the myriad of forms of
ownership interests that are available. Yet knowledge of the owner-
ship formats and their advantages and disadvantages is critical in
making a sound time-share investment. Because of the various op-
tions open to a prospective purchaser, the ensuing potential liabili-
ties, and the great difficulty in obtaining full information in order to
make an educated purchase, it is critical that time share interests be
appropriately regulated. 158
III. The Current Regulatory Environment
Purchasers of time-share interests in a condominium are thrust
into complex and easily misunderstood property relationships. They
become involved in a novel interdependence with the developer and
other time-share owners.' 59 As a result, there is a great potential for
152 See Note, supra note 5, at 214.
153 Id.
154 A burden which one author notes in particular is that a conveyance of a time-share
interest as a fee requires a revision of conventional property law concepts. See Note, supra
note 5, at 211.
155 See Conroy, supra note 6, at 6-10.
156 Id. at 8.
157 See Eastman, supra note 5, at 158.
158 For a further discussion of time share regulation, see Gunnar, Resort Time-Sharing. Cur-
rent Regulation. . . and the Alternatives, CORNELL H.R.A. Q., Nov. 1978, at 28.
159 Jones, State Regulation of Condominiumn (Prepared for the Department of Research, The
Council of State Governments) (1976).
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consumer dissatisfaction as well as fraud on the part of developers. 60
A major concern for purchasers is obtaining full and complete
disclosure. The federal government and several states have at-
tempted to address these problems by regulating the relationship be-
tween developer and time-share purchasers.' 61 However, because of
confusion in defining time-share offerings arising from the multitude
of programs made available by developers, a corresponding confu-
sion in regulation has resulted. Defining time-shares as real estate
interests would place them under the auspices of the Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and state real estate com-
missions. 62 If deemed securities, time-shares would fall under the
jurisdiction of the SEC and state securities commissions. 63 Finally, if
classified simply as prepaid vacations, they would most probably be
governed by consumer protection laws, the Federal Trade Commis-
sion (FTC), and correlative state agencies. 64 Such a plethora of con-
flicting regulation, however, results in all developers-both
responsible and irresponsible-being caught in the uncertain web of
compliance. Ostensibly, developers seek a realistic regulatory scheme
which does not subject the offer, sale, and operation of time share
programs to artificial, unnecessary, or confusing restrictions. 65
Currently, however, developers are subject to a confusing dupli-
cation and cross-current of regulation 66 resulting largely from an at-
tempt by most regulators to fit time-share interests into existing
federal and state statutes rather than to create distinct legislation for
this novel form of real estate ownership. 67 This procrustean ap-
proach has been effected only by distorting existing concepts and
statutes. The result has been "duplicate and triplicate regulation
and the imposition of artificial requirements which do not contribute
to public protection."' 68
160 The possible magnitude of such fraud was recently brought to light by a case prose-
cuted by the Federal Trade Commission involving the sale of thousands of time-share inter-
ests in Hawaii. See FTC v. Paradise Palms Vacation Club, No. C811160V (W.D. Wash. Sept.
30, 1981), and notes 206-13 infra and accompanying text.
161 Time-share interests in one form or another have been subject to SEC, FTC, and
HUD scrutiny. See notes 206-13 infia and accompanying text. To date, Florida, Hawaii,
Nebraska, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia have enacted specific legislation dealing
with time-sharing. See notes 226-468 infra and accompanying text.
162 See notes 197-203 infia and accompanying text.
163 See notes 170-95 in/ra and accompanying text.
164 See notes 204-17 in/fa and accompanying text.
165 See Gunnar, supra note 8, at 44.
166 Id. at 45.
167 Id.
168 Id.
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These problems clearly point to the need for uniform regulation
of time-share interests. Before proposing such a solution to the prob-
lem, it is important first to examine the regulatory environment in
which time-share interests now operate. In addition to the three fed-
eral regulatory bodies which presently regulate time-share interest-
the SEC, FTC, and HUD-these interests are also subject to condo-
minium regulation in some states. In a number of states, however,
specific time-share acts have been passed. Furthermore, there are
currently two proposed uniform time-share acts. This section dis-
cusses the present regulatory environment of time-sharing; the next
section examines and compares current state statutes with the two
uniform statutes; and the final section proposes recommendations for
uniform legislation to address the problem areas.
A. Regulaion of Time-Share Interests as Securities
Presently, it is uncertain whether time-share offerings must be
registered under federal securities laws, although a number of
states169 do require registration of a time-share offering as a secur-
ity.1 70 The possible jurisdiction of the SEC over time-share offerings
is determined by the Federal Securities Act of 1933171 and the Securi-
ties and Exchange Act of 1934.172
The Securities Act of 1933 specifically defines "security" to in-
clude investment contracts, 173 thereby requiring their registration.
Thus classification of a time-share interest as a security depends on
its characterization as an investment contract. 74 The traditional test
used for determining whether an arrangement constitutes an invest-
ment contract ii set forth in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co. 175 There the
Supreme Court defined an investment contract as:
a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his
money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely
from the efforts of the promoter or a third party, it being immate-
169 Alaska, Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, Oklahoma, Oregon, Washington, and
Wisconsin. See Gunnar, supra note 8, at 41.
170 See, e.g., Lowery v. Ford Hill Investment Co., 192 Colo. 125, 556 P.2d 1201 (1976)
(The sale of a time-share unit, under certain circumstances, constitutes the offering of a
security.).
171 Federal Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, tit. I, § 1, 48 Stat. 74 (1933). (current version at
15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77a to 77bbbb (West 1971 & Supp 1980)).
172 Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 1, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (current version
at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78a to 78111 (West 1971 & Supp. 1980)).
173 15 U.S.C.A. 77b(1) (West 1971 & Supp. 1980).
174 Eastman, supra note 4, at 158.
175 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
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rial whether the shares in the enterprise are evidenced by formal
certificates or by nominal interests in the physical assets employed
in the enterprise.' 76
Thirty-one years after Howey, the SEC in 1967 issued Release No.
4877 in which it indicated that "rental arrangements and pooling in
real estate promotions constituted investment contract securities
within the definition of the Howy case."' 1
77
Clearly time-share investments may be characterized as "an in-
vestment of money in a common enterprise." However, time-share
purchasers must also expect to derive profits from their interest in
order for it to be classified as a security. Pursuant to a case decided
after Howey, United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman,178 the Supreme
Court defined the profits associated with investment contracts as
either "capital appreciation resulting from the development of the
initial investment,.. . or participation in earnings resulting from the
use of investors' funds . . . . In such cases, the investor is 'attracted
solely by the prospects of a return' on his investment."' 179 On the
other hand, the Court stated that the securities laws do not apply
when the purchaser was motivated by a desire to use or consume the
interest purchased.So The facts of Fonnan, where the investment in-
terest involved was stock in a housing cooperative, are germane to
time-shares. Fundamental to the Court's decision was its finding
that the purchaser had procured the shares in the housing coopera-
tive for purposes of private consumption and not with a view toward
profit.' 8 '
Time-share offerings must also be examined in light of SEC Re-
176 Id. at 298-99. The Howey criteria, although still valid today, have been to some extent
modified by subsequent federal court cases. In one case, the Ninth Circuit held that even
where a "modicum of effort" was contributed by the investor, the Howey requirement of prof-
its derived solely from the efforts of others was applicable. See SEC v. Glenn W. Turner
Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir. 1973). In a Fifth Circuit decision, the court similarly
focused on "whether the efforts made by those other than the investor are the undeniably
significant ones." SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 483 (5th Cir. 1974) (cit-
ing SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., supra).
177 Ellsworth, Condominiums Are Securities, 2 REAL EST. L.J. 695 (1974). Specifically, the
Commission obtained the first registration statement covering a condominium offering from
Hale Kaanapoli Apartment Hotel Development Corp., Registration Statement No. 2-25489
(Apr. 13, 1967), after informing that company that the offer and sale of condominiums, cou-
pled with an option to have one's unit operate as part of a resort hotel, was an offer and sale
of a security. See Gunnar, supra note 8, at 36 n.24; Comment, Condominium Regulation: Beyond
Disclosure, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 639, 652 n.67 (1975).
178 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
179 Id. at 852.
180 Id. at 852-53, 858.
181 Id. at 852-53.
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lease No. 5347182 which establishes when the offering of condomin-
ium units will not constitute the offering of securities:
If the condominiums are not offered and sold with emphasis on the
economic benefits to the purchaser to be derived from the manage-
rial efforts of others, and assuming that no plan to avoid the regis-
tration requirements of the Securities Act is involved, an owner of a
condominium unit may, after purchasing his unit, enter into a non-
pooled rental arrangement with an agent not designated or re-
quired to be used as a condition to the purchase, whether or not
such agent is affiliated with the offeror, without causing a sale of
security to be involved in the sale of the unit. Further a continuing
affiliation between the developers or promoters of a project and the
project by reason of maintenance arrangements does not make the
unit a security.' 8 3
Generally, time-share units are not purchased with a view toward
profit, but rather for the purpose of personal enjoyment and "con-
sumption." Thus it would appear that with proper structuring of the
transaction, sale of time-share interests may avoid the characteristics
of a security.1 8 4 However, the SEC has yet to interpret any time-
share offerings in light of either Howey, Forman, or the more recent
Grenader v. Spitz 585 decision. Since 1974 the SEC's policy has been to
refuse to comment on offerings of time-share interests. 186 Previously
182 SEC Sec. Act Release No. 5347, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 79,163, at 82, 535 (Jan. 4, 1973). For discussions of the application of Securities
Laws to Condominiums, see Clurman, Condominiums as Securities.- A Current Look, 19 N.Y.L.F.
457 (1974); Rosenbaum, The Resort Condominium and the Federal Securities Laws-A Case Stud in
Governmental Infexibiliy , 60 VA. L. REV. 785 (1974); Note, Federal Securities Regulation of Condo-
miniums: A Purchaser's Perspective, 62 GEO. L.J. 1403 (1974).
183 SEC Sec. Act Release No. 5347, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 79,163, at 82, 540 (Jan. 4, 1973).
184 A developer may take certain precautions to assure that the sale of time-share interests
does not constitute securities. The developer should avoid all representations to a prospective
seller concerning profits on resale of the interest. The agreement should avoid providing for
any pooling arrangements for the rental of the time-share units when not in use by the own-
ers. Furthermore, if time-share owners express an interest in renting their units, the developer
or manager should recommend seeking the services of an autonomous agency. Eastman,supra
note 4, at 159; Pollack, supra note 18, at 294; see also Yurow, Resort Condominiums. Rental and
Time Sharing Programs; Tax and Securities Problems, 33 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAx'N L. 1193, 1223
(1975).
185 537 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1976). In this case the Second Circuit relied on Forman to find
that shares purchased in a private cooperative apartment corporation were not within the
purview of the SEC.
186 The SEC did not, however, withdraw its previous no-action letters, nor did it take a
position that time-share offerings were securities. The SEC expressed concern that fallacious
inferences might be drawn from the issuance of no-action letters in this area and warned
recipients of previous letters not to rely on them for future projects, stating:
While no-action letters are limited to the facts presented, . . . and do not represent
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the SEC had freely stated its opinion in "no action" letters' 87 with
respect to the securities question surrounding time share offers.' 88
At the same time that the SEC has refused to take a definitive
position as to whether, and under what circumstances, time-share of-
ferings will be deemed securities, diverse state interpretations have
arisen. Certain states have relied on a more expansive test than that
used by the federal government, adopting a risk capital test to be
used in conjunction with the "Howey-Forman" test. 89 Originally the
risk capital analysis, as formulated by Chief Justice Traynor in Silver
Hills Counti Club v. Sobieski,'90 asked whether a purchaser risked his
investment with others toward the end of achieving future benefits.
Subsequently this analysis was expanded in State v. Hawaii Market
Center, Inc. ,,9 where the court promulgated a four-part risk capital
test:
[W]e hold that for the purposes of the Hawaii Uniform Securities
Act (Modified) an investment contract is created whenever:
(1) An offeree furnishes initial value to an offeror, and
(2) A portion of this initial value is subjected to the risks of the
enterprise, and
(3) The furnishing of the initial value is induced by the offeror's
promises or representations which give rise to a reasonable under-
standing that a valuable benefit of some kind, over and above the
initial value, will accrue to the offeree as a result of the operation of
the enterprise, and
(4) The offeree does not receive the right to exercise practical and
actual control over the managerial decisions of the enterprise.
The above test provides, we believe, the necessary broad coverage
an interpretation of the law even as to these, the Commission is, nevertheless, con-
cerned that inferences might be drawn from the issuance of no-action letters in this
rapidly evolving area. Such inferences could lead to misunderstandings as to the
Commission's position, and to contentions in future situations that the Commission
had taken a position that it had not in fact taken. The Commission has conse-
quently directed the staff not to issue no-action letters in this area, and to advise
that no-action letters issued in the past in this general field do not extend beyond
the particular issuer involved and should not be relied upon by any other person or
by the persons receiving prior letters for any other offerings.
SEC No-Action Letter, In re Tropics International, 252 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) C-I (May
6, 1974).
187 For a full discussion of the SEC's pre-and post-1974 position on no action letters in
reference to time-shares purchases as investments, see Ellsworth and Pendergast, Securities
Maze Awaits Resort Time-Share Oferings, 10 REAL EST. REv. 59 (Spring 1980).
188 Id. at 60. See The Innisfree Corp., [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP,. (CCH)
73398 at 83, 154 (Apr. 5, 1973); Carribbean Beach Club, Inc., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 78819, at 801, 803 (Apr. 25, 1972).
189 See notes 175-81 supra.
190 55 Cal.2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961).
191 52 Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971).
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to protect th& public from the novel as well as the conventional
forms of financing enterprises.192
It is this test which a growing number of states are utilizing in deter-
mining whether an offering constitutes an "investment contract" and
thus a security.1 93 Nonetheless, there is a general lack of uniformity
in the states' application of either the risk capital analysis expounded
in Silver Hills County Club or the four-prong test enunciated in Hawaii
Market Center, even when states have adopted the Uniform Securities
Act. 194
The consensus among commentators is that securities laws
should not apply to most time-share offerings. 195
The "risks" incidental to the time-share unit and the control ele-
ment involved in time-share offerings are those found in connection
with the operation of most condominium purchases or long-term
leases. The "benefits derived" from time-share ownership are not
pecuniary gain but rather savings of "vacation costs" analogous to
the savings of "housing costs" commented upon in Forman.196
The SEC's refusal to comment on time-share offerings and the vari-
ous states' responses to offerings in their territories have confused
both developer and consumer, highlighting all the more the need for
definitive legislation governing these offerings.
B. Regulation of Time-Share Interests as Real Estate
The Office of Interstate Land Sales Registration (OILSR) has
taken the position that because condominiums carry the indicia of
real estate, the units are a subdivision of real estate and are subject to
the provisions of the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act 97
(ILSFDA). ILSFDA is a disclosure statute whose primary focus is on
the sale of recreational lots. The National Association of Home
Builders was successful in its efforts to obtain provisions which effec-
tively exempt most recreational housing from registration require-
ments. Section 1702 of ILSFDA specifically exempts residential
housing which is contracted to be completed and delivered within
192 Id. at 648-49, 485 P.2d at 109 (footnote omitted). This test was first proposed by Pro-
fessor Ronald J. Coffey; see Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Securiy": Is There a More Mean-
ingful Formula?, 18 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 367 (1967).
193 Byrne, supra note 15, at 7.
194 Id. at 13.
195 See, e.g., Byrne, supra note 15, at 13; Eastman, supra note 4, at 159.
196 Byrne, supra note 15, at 13.
197 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1720 (1982).
[1983]
TIME-SHARE INTERESTS
two years.19 8 As one author notes,19 9 the act is so mechanically struc-
tured and is so oriented towards real estate that considerations ger-
mane to a consumer's decision in purchasing second-home rental
housing were covered only cursorily if at all. For example, the act
requires disclosure of distances to the nearest schools and shopping
areas but not the number of tourists visiting the area, the seasonality
of tourism, or an inventory of competing resort accommodations. 200
Most developers, however, have discovered that they may avoid reg-
ulation by HUD/OILSR registration simply by structuring their of-
ferings so that no specific unit is designated as the time-share or,
more typically, by availing themselves of the exemption under Sec-
tion 1702 for structures to be built within two years.20 1
Because exemption from OILSR regulation in practice is readily
available, the absence of a definitive federal position again has left
the regulation of time-share offerings to the states. Thus the real es-
tate or land sales regulatory agencies of the states in which time-share
offerings are made may exercise jurisdiction over them. Exemptions
may also be obtained at the state level in states which have patterned
their statutes on the federal one. Recently several states refused to
exert jurisdiction under their subdivision registration laws over cer-
tain types of right to use time-share offerings. 20 2 In California, for
example, the type of offering which escaped state jurisdiction did not
involve the use of a particular unit or the conveyance of a fee title to
the real property, but instead consisted of a non-proprietary time-
share interest acquired by the purchaser for his use and enjoyment.20 3
C. Regulation of Time-Share Interests as Consumer Transactions
Time-sharing as an alternative to the purchase of a vacation
home has increased in popularity to such a degree 20 4 that inevitably
some consumers will fall prey to fraudulent transactions or some
form of misconduct or malfeasance by time-share sellers. Indeed,
several time-share promoters and projects have recently attracted the
attention of the FTC in connection with transactions which left the
consumers with far less in the way of a vacation home than they had
198 15 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(2) (1982).
199 Gunnar, supra note 8, at 35.
200 Statement of Record, 24 C.F.R. § 1710.105 (1977).
201 15 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(2) (1982).
202 Ellsworth and Pendergast, supra note 187, at 60.
203 CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF REAL ESTATE ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATION,
CLUB MAEVA LAS HADAS (May 23, 1979).
204 See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
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anticipated. 205
The FTC recently took on the time-share industry in a
landmark case involving the sale of time-share units in Hawaii. One
author suggests that the decision, Federal Trade Commission v. Paradse
Palms Vacation Club,206 will serve as a primer in this area for future
private litigation by victimized consumers. 20 7 The malfeasance in
this case involved not only the developers but also the time share
sales organizations and the owners' association or clubs, as well as
several individuals. The FTC alleged that these parties had commit-
ted numerous violations of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act 208 amounting to deceptive and unfair trade practices. The
promoters sold approximately three thousand time-share interests at
six thousand dollars each, using enticing literature featuring pictures
of luxurious Hawaiian condominium units on or near the back of
Waikiki. In fact, the defendants had enough Hawaiian units to ac-
commodate at most twenty percent of the time-share buyers. The
remaining eighty percent were offered "comparable" units at Lake
Tahoe and Ocean Shores, Washington. A report 20 9 filed by the
court-appointed special counsel revealed that the "comparable"
units were far from being that and were in fact undesirable as vaca-
tion sites. In sum, the defendants were alleged to have misrepre-
sented the availability of the Hawaiian time-share units and to have
been unable to deliver comparable units at comparable sites.210 The
defendants were further charged with failing to provide membership
in a large time-share resort exchange network21' which had been
used in the advertising to entice purchasers. The transaction was al-
leged to violate the Federal Trade Commission Act in that the con-
tracts signed by various purchasers did not contain language which
the FTC's holder in due course rule requires. 212 So far the case has
205 See, e.g., Guenther, Jin Quincy ir a Master at Selzng Resort Units, But Buyers Complain,
Wall St. J., June 22, 1982, at 1, col. 1 (discussion of time-sharing projects dealing with fraudu-
lent and abusive practices of promoters); TIME, Aug. 16, 1982, at 54 (highlight of problems
facing consumers in the purchasing of time-share units).
206 FTC v. Paradise Palms Vacation Club, No. C811160V (W.D. Wash. Sept. 30, 1981).
207 Dickerson, "Litigating Resort Timeshare Abuses," Nat'l L.J., June 7, 1982, at 44.
208 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976).
209 See FTC v. Paradise Palms Vacation Club, No. C811160V (W.D. Wash. Sept. 30,
1981), Motion of The Paradise Palms Vacation Club Special Counsel for an Order In-
structing Special Counsel as to His Further Administration of and Responsibilities in Regard
to Paradise Palms Vacation Club, dated Nov. 24, 1981.
210 Id. It was alleged that the value of the substitute units was found to be substantially
lower than that of the units in Hawaii.
211 Id.
212 Dickerson, supra note 207, at 45.
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resulted in a preliminary injunction against several defendants and
the appointment of special counsel to administer the assets of the
owners' association.213
IV. Current Legislative Approaches at the State Level
Allegations made in Paradise Palms concerning the possibilities
for fraud and misrepresentation unique to the time-share industry
emphasize the need for legislation to provide consumer protection in
this area. Furthermore, because of the lack of SEC guidance in de-
termining when time-share interests are securities, and of HUD gui-
dance as to classification of the interest as real estate, states have
stepped in to regulate time-share interests under various, and often
conflicting, theories. For example, to sell a time-share offering in Or-
egon, Washington, Alaska, Illinois, Oklahoma, Michigan, Minne-
sota, or Wisconsin, developers must register it as a security with their
respective securities agencies. 21 4 On the other hand, in California,
Hawaii, Texas, and Colorado, developers must register the offerings
with their respective real estate departments.21 5 While in New York,
New Jersey, and Florida, developers must register time-share offer-
ings under the state consumer protection laws.2 1 6 In still other states,
dual registration of the offering is required.2t 7
Thus time-sharing is currently regulated in various states under
various types of statutes including condominium acts, subdivision
acts, land sales acts, real estate licensing acts, consumer protection
acts', and securities acts.218 Regulation under these acts typically be-
gins with opinions issued by state agencies determine that time-shar-
ing is subject to a given act. State agencies may approach time-share
offerings on a case by case basis,21 9 or adopt administrative regula-
tions which have the force of law.22 0 Alternatively, states may pass
legislation that either amends existing law to incorporate time-shar-
ing221 or regulate some aspects of time sharing.222
213 Dickerson, "Litigating Resort Timeshare Abuses," Nat'l L.J., June 14, 1982, at 45.
214 See Gunnar, supra note 18, at 41.
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 Id.
218 Smith, "Timesharing Regulation by the States," Nat'l L.J., May 10, 1982, at 34.
219 Id.
220 Id. Florida, for example, was one of the first states to adopt administrative regulations,
since superseded by time-share legislation, designed particularly to address time-sharing.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 721 (West Supp. 1983).
221 d. California has amended its subdivided land statute to regulate time-sharing. See
CAL. Bus & PROF. CODE § 1100.35 - 11004.8 (West 1983). Similarly, South Dakota recently
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Another means by which certain state agencies may obtain juris-
diction over time-share offerings is "self-executing" statutes under
which time-share interests automatically fall because of the manner
in which they operate.2 23 Finally, several states regulate time-share
offerings under existing securities statutes, consumer protection stat-
utes, or land sales statutes.2 24
Today, for lack of a better or more formal solution, time-sharing
has been regulated at the state level most frequently under existing
state condominium laws, which determine the legal rights and liabili-
ties of developers, sales personnel, and purchasers of time sharing
property. As at least one author has pointed out, however, that be-
cause of the great variation in time-share interests and the unique
qualities that the dimension of time brings to such interests, condo-
minium laws are neither appropriate nor adequate to regulate time
sharing estates.2 25 Accordingly, a growing number of states have rec-
ognized the need for better regulation of time shares. To date Flor-
ida,226 Georgia, 22 7 Hawaii, 2 28 Nebraska, 2 29 Nevada, 2 30  South
Carolina,231 Tennessee, 232 Virginia, 233 and Washington 234 have en-
acted specific legislation dealing with time sharing.
Although there is no enacted uniform legislation, two model acts
have been proposed for regulating time-share ownership. Adoption
of such legislation by the states would be desirable, if only to avoid
conflicts among the states.2 35 The first was proposed by the National
Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws, Unifonn Real
Estate Tme Share Act (URETSA), 236 the second is the Model Time-
amended its horizontal property rights statute to incorporate time-share units. See S.D. CODI-
FIED LAWS ANN. § 43-15B (1983). Utah amended its Land Sales Practices Act to bring time-
sharing within its scope. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-11 (1983).
222 Connecticut and Maine, for example, have enacted legislation regulating some limited
aspects of time-sharing. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-103w. to 42-103bb.; ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 33, § 588 (1982).
223 Smith, supra note 218, at 34.
224 See notes 168-218 supra and accompanying text.
225 Pollack, supra note 18, at 295.
226 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 721 (West 1981 & Supp. 1982).
227 GA. CODE § 44-3-160 (1983).
228 HAWAII REV. STAT. § 514E (Supp. 1980).
229 NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1701 (1980).
230 1983 Nev. Stat. ch. 401, § 1.
231 S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-32 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982).
232 TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-32 (1981).
233 VA. CODE § 55-360 (1981).
234 1983 Wash. Legis Serv. ch. 22, § 1.
235 See URETSA, Commissioners' Prefatory Note, 7A U.L.A. 259 (1979 & Supp. 1983).
236 Id § 1-101, at 259, 261.
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Share Ownersh,' Act, 23 7 adopted by the Resort Time-Sharing Council
of the American Land Development Association and the National
Association of Real Estate License Law Officials (the
RTC/NARELLO Act). Both model acts address a number of com-
mon issues, including the status and taxation of time-share units;238
their creation, termination, and management;2 39 protection of pur-
chasers; 240 and administration and registration by a regulatory
body.241 Yet the two model acts differ markedly, not only in their
scope and specificity, but also in fundamentals such as definitions. 242
In general, URETSA is the more detailed and comprehensive of the
two. To date, the RTC/NARELLO Act has had a greater influence
237 RTC/NARELLO Model Time-Share Ownership Act (1979) [hereinafter cited as
RTC/NARELLO Act].
238 The status and taxation of time-share estates is defined in URETSA as:
(a) Except as expressly modified by this Act and notwithstanding any contrary
rule of common law, a grant of an estate in a unit conferring the right of possession
during a potentially infinite number of separated time periods creates an estate in
fee simple having the character and incidents of such an estate at common law, and
a grant of an estate in a unit conferring the right of possession during [5] or more
separated time periods over a finite number of years equal to [5] or more, including
renewal options, creates an estate for years having the character and incidents of
such an estate at common law.
(b) Each time-share estate constitutes for all purposes a separate estate in real
property. Each time-share estate (other than a time-share estate for years) must
(not) be separately assessed and taxed. (Notices of assessments and bills for taxes
must be furnished to the managing entity, if any, or otherwise to each time-share
owner, but the managing entity is not liable for the taxes as a result thereof.)
(c) A document transferring or encumbering a time-share estate may not be
rejected for recordation because of the nature or duration of that estate.
RTC/NARELLO defines the status of the time-share estate much more generally:
(A) A "Time-Share Estate" is an estate in real property and has the character and
incidents of an estate in fee simple at common law or estate for years, if a leasehold,
except as expressly modified by this Act. The foregoing shall supercede any con-
trary rule at common law.
(B) A document transferring or encumbering a Time-Share Estate in real property
may not be rejected for recordation because of the nature or duration of that estate
or interest.
RTC/NARELLO Act § 1-104 (1979).
239 URETSA § 2-101 to 2-108, 7A U.L.A. (1979 & Supp. 1983); RTC/NARELLO Act
§§ 2-101 to 2-107 (1979). While RTC/NARELLO specified that a time-share program may
be created in any unit, unless specifically prohibited by statute, see RTC/NARELLO Act § 2-
101 (1979), URETSA in contrast requires specifically that instruments provide for time-
sharing.
240 URETSA §§ 4-101 to 4-116, 7A U.L.A. 259, 289-300 (1979 & Supp. 1983);
RTC/NARELLO Act §§ 3-101 to 3-110 (1979).
241 URETSA §§5-101 to 5-110, 7A U.L.A. 259, 301-06 (1979 & Supp. 1983);
RTC/NARELLO Act §§ 4-101 to 4-107 (1979).
242 See, e.g., the difference in the definition of time-share estate, notes 244-46 infra and
accompanying text.
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than URETSA on the drafting of specific time-share legislation. Ne-
braska and Tennessee, for example, have substantially adopted
RTC/NARELLO, while Georgia and Virginia have followed it to a
lesser extent.
A. Defition of Time-sharing
A critical need of time-share ownership to establish uniform ter-
minology, especially a uniform definition of time-sharing. Currently
there is considerable divergence, with the consequent possibility of
litigation. Standardized definitions would certainly reduce confusion
for the time-share purchaser who is already at a disadvantage in
comprehending the nature of the property interest he has purchased.
The model acts vary in a number of respects in their definition
of time-shares. URETSA defines a time-share as either "a time-share
estate or a time-share license. '243 The RTC/NARELLO Act defines
a time-share estate as "a right to occupy a unit or any of several units
during [5] or more separate time periods over a period of at least [5]
years, including renewal options, coupled with a freehold estate or an
estate for years in a time-share property or a specified portion
thereof. ' 244 A time-share license is defined by URETSA as "a right
to occupy a unit or any of several units during [5] or more separated
time periods over a period of at least [5] years, including renewal
options, not coupled with a freehold estate or an estate for years. ' 245
In contrast, the definition in the RTC/NARELLO Act is less spe-
cific: "'Time-Share Estate' means, an ownership or leasehold estate
in property devoted to a time-share fee (tenants in common, time
span ownership, internal ownership) and a timeshare lease. ' 246
Furthermore, there is a lack of consensus in the definitions
among those states which have adopted specific time-share legisla-
tion. Nebraska and Tennessee, which adopted time share legislation
in 1980 and 1981 respectively, 247  both followed the
RTC/NARELLO definition; while Virginia, which enacted time-
share legislation in 1981, adopted the URETSA definition of a time-
share estate.248 Hawaii and California, which each adopted time-
share legislation in 1980, define time-share estates in yet a different
243 URETSA § 1-102(13) 7A U.L.A. (1979 & Supp. 1983).
244 Id. § 1-102(14).
245 Id § 1-12(18).
246 RTC/NARELLO Act § 1-103 (1979).
247 NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1702(13) (1981); TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-32-102 (1982 & Supp.
1983).
248 VA. CODE § 55-362(16) (1981).
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manner. Hawaii 249 defines the concept in terms of a periodically re-
curring entitlement to use, occupy, or possess. Recent legislative en-
actments in Georgia and Nevada have added to the disparity among
definitions of time-share interests. 250 Neither the Florida nor South
Carolina statutes defines the time-share estate, but instead address
the concept only in terms of a time-sharing plan. The South Caro-
lina definition distinguishes between a vacation time-share lease plan
and a vacation time-sharing ownership plan,25' but includes both in
its definition of vacation time-sharing plans. 252 The Florida defini-
tion of time-sharing plan253 is extremely broad and comprehensive.
Washington defines time-shares broadly like URETSA to include
both time-share estates licenses.254
249 Hawaii's definition of time-share interest is "any interest in a time share unit or plan
which entitles thq owner or holder thereof to the use, occupancy or possession of a time share
unit on a periodically recurring basis." HAWAI REY. STAT. § 514E-1 (Supp. 1982).
250 GA. CODE § 44-3-162 (1983); 1983 Nev. Stat. ch. 401, § 11.
251 "Vacation time sharing ownership plan" means any arrangement, plan or similar
devise, whether by tenancy in common, sale, deed or by other means, which is
subject to supplemental agreement or contract for use of the time share unit,
whereby the purchaser receives an undivided ownership interest in and the right to
use accommodations or facilities, or both, for a specific period of time during any
given year, but not necessarily for consecutive years, which extends for a period of
more than one year.
"Vacation time sharing lease plan" means any arrangement, plan or similar
devise, whether by membership agreement, lease, rental agreement, license, use
agreement, security or other means, whereby the purchaser receives a right to use
accommodations or facilities, or both, but does not receive an undivided fee simple
interest in the property, for a specific period of time during any given year, but not
necessarily for consecutive years, and which extends for a period of more than one
year.
Such lease plans do not include an arrangement or agreement whereby a pur-
chaser in exchange for an advance fee and yearly dues is entitled to select from a
designated list of facilities located in more than one state accommodations, of com-
panies which operate nationwide in at least nine states in the United States through
franchises or ownership, for a specified time period and at reduced rates and under
which no interest in real property is transferred.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-32-10(8), (9) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982).
252 "'Vacation timesharing plan' means either a vacation time sharing ownership plan or
a vacation timesharing lease plan as defined herein." S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-32-10(10) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1982).
253 "Time sharing plan" means any arrangement, plan, scheme, or similar device,
other than an exchange program, whether by membership, agreement, tenancy in
common, sale, lease, deed, rental agreement, license, right to use agreement, or by
any other means, whereby a purchaser, in exchange for a consideration, receives a
right to use accommodations or facilities, or both, for a specific period of time less
than a full year during any given year, but not necessarily for consecutive years,
and which extends for a period of more than 3 years.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 721.05(14) (West Supp. 1982).
254 1983 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch. 22, § 1 (West).
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Most statutes, including both model acts, limit their application
according to the duration and/or number of time-share periods.
Under URETSA, both the specified duration as well as the specified
minimum number of times of usage2 55 are required; whereas
RTC/NARELLO, although providing for a specified duration, does
not provide for any minimum number of usage periods in its defini-
tion of time-share estate.256 Nebraska has substantially adopted the
RTC/NARELLO definition of time-share programs,2 57 and Virginia
has adopted another variation. 258 Hawaii defines a time-share plan
to include only those units which are occupied for less than a sixty
day period in any year by any occupant. 259 Florida defines time-
sharing plans to include a right to use accommodations for a specific
period of less than a full year during any given year but not necessar-
ily for consecutive years, and which extends for a period of more than
three years.2 6° Washington's definition of a time-share requires five
or more separate periods over at least five years. 261
B. Regulatoy Body
In light of the regulatory issues that time-share offerings raise, it
would be desirable for these property interests to be subject to a sin-
gle regulatory body within the state. 262 Some of the state statutes do
specify a time-share regulatory body: Florida (Division of Florida
Land Sales and Condominiums of the Department of Business Regu-
lation), 263 Georgia (Georgia Real Estate Commission),264 Hawaii
(Hawaii Real Estate Commission),265 Nevada (Real Estate Division
of the Department of Commerce),266 South Carolina (South Carolina
255 See notes 244-45 supra and accompanying text.
256 "Time-share program" means any arrangement for Time-Share Intervals in a Time-
Share Project whereby the use, occupancy or possession of real property has been made sub-
ject to either a Time-Share Estate or Time-Share Use whereby such use, occupancy or posses-
sion circulates among purchasers of the Time-Share Intervals according to a fixed or floating
time schedule on a periodic basis occuring [sic] annually over any period of time in excess of
three (3) years in duration." RTC/NARELLO Act § 1-103 (1979).
257 NEB. RaV. STAT. § 76-1702(16) (1981).
258 VA. CODE § 55-362(21) (1981).
259 HAwAII REV. STAT. § 514E-1 (Supp. 1982).
260 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 721.05(14) (West Supp. 1982).
261 1983 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch. 22, § 1 (West).
262 See text accompanying notes 214-17 supra; and Gunnar, supra note 8, at 41-42.
263 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 721.05(6) (West Supp. 1982).
264 GA. CODE § 44-3-162(2) (Supp. 1983).
265 HAWAII REV. STAT. § 514E-1 (Supp. 1982).
266 1983 Nev. Stat. ch. 401, § 5.
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Real Estate Commission),267 Tennessee (Tennessee Real Estate Com-
mission),268 Virginia (Virginia Real Estate. Commission),2 69 and
Washington (Director of Licensing). 270 Both the URETSA271 and
the RTC/NARELLO Acts272 have optional provisions for a regula-
tory body to be determined by the state of adoption.
The statutes empower the regulatory body to perform a number
of functions, including:
(1) register time-share offerings (Florida,273 Georgia, 274 Hawaii, 275
Nevada,276 South Carolina, 277 Tennessee,278 Virginia,279 Washing-
ton,280 URETSA,28' and RTC/NARELLO Act28 2);
(2) register developers or sales agents (Hawaii,283 Nevada,284 Ten-
nessee,285 Virginia 2 86 and Washington 287;
(3) adopt, amend, and repeal rules, regulations, and orders (Geor-
gia,288 Hawaii, 289 South Carolina,29° Tennessee, 29 1 Virginia,292 Ne-
braska,2 93 Nevada, 294 Washington, 2 95 URETSA, 2 96 and
267 S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-32-10(4) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982).
268 TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-32-102(2) (1982).
269 VA. CODE § 55-362(2) (1981).
270 1983 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch. 22, § 1(3).
271 URETSA § 5-101, 7A U.L.A. 301 (1979 & Supp. 1983).
272 RTC/NARELLO Act § 1-103 (1979).
273 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 721.07 (West Supp. 1982).
274 GA. CODE § 44-3-191 (Supp. 1983).
275 HAwAII REV. STAT. § 514E-10 (Supp. 1982).
276 1983 Nev. Stat. ch. 401, §§ 19-22.
277 S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-32-20 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982).
278 TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-32-122 (1982).
279 VA. CODE § 55-390 (1981).
280 1983 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch. 22, § 2.
281 The registration requirement in URETSA states: "A developer may not offer or trans-
fer a time share unless the time share is registered with the agency, but an offering by a
developer of time shares in no more than one time-share unit at any one time is exempt from
the requirements of this section and Section 5-103(b)." URETSA § 5-102, 7A U.L.A. 302
(1979 & Supp. 1983).
282 RTC/NARELLO Act § 4-102 (1979).
283 HAWAII REv. STAT. § 514E-10(c) (Supp. 1982).
284 1983 Nev. Stat. ch. 401, §§ 31-32.
285 TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-32-122(c) (1982).
286 VA. CODE § 55-396 (1981).
287 1983 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch. 22, § 8.
288 GA. CODE § 44-3-198(b) (Supp. 1983).
289 HAWAI REV. STAT. § 514E-13 (Supp. 1982).
290 S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-32-130 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982).
291 TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-22-121 (1981).
292 VA. CODE § 55-396 (1981).
293 NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1725(1) (Supp. 1982).
294 1983 Nev. Stat. ch. 401, § 32(7).
295 1983 Wash Legis. Serv. ch. 22, § 26.
296 URETSA § 5-107, 7A U.L.A: 304 (1979 & Supp. 1983).
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RTC/NARELLO Act 29 7);
(4) conduct investigations (Florida, 298 Georgia, 299 Hawaii, 30 0 Ne-
braska,30 1 Nevada, 30 2 South Carolina,30 3 Tennessee, 30 4 Virginia, 30 5
Washington,30 6 URETSA,30 7 and RTC/NARELLO Act3O8);
(5) issue cease and desist orders (Florida,30 9 Georgia,3 10 Hawaii,3 11
Nebraska, 3 12 Nevada, 3 13 Tennessee,3 14 Virginia,3 15 Washington, 316
URETSA, 317 and RTC/NARELLO Act3 1 );
(6) impose civil penalties (Florida,3 19 Hawaii,320  and South
Carolina 32 1);
(7) institute judicial enforcement proceedings (Florida,322 Geor-
gia, 323 Hawaii, 32 4 Nebraska, 325 Nevada,3 26 Virginia,32 7 and
URETSA328 );
(8) revoke registrations of time share offerings (Georgia,329 Ha-
waii,330 Nebraska, 3 1 Nevada,3 32 Tennessee,3 33 Virginia,33 4 Wash-
297 RTC/NARELLO Act § 4-101 (1979).
298 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 721.26(1) (West Supp. 1983).
299 GA. CODE § 44-3-201 (1983).
300 HAwAii REV. STAT. § 514E- 11.2 (Supp. 1982).
301 NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1725(4) (Supp. 1982).
302 1983 Nev. Stat. ch. 401, § 19.5.
303 S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-32-190(c) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982).
304 TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-32-121(C) (1981).
305 VA. CODE § 55-399 (1981).
306 1983 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch. 22, § 18 (West).
307 URETSA § 5-108, 7A U.L.A. 308 (1979 & Supp. 1983).
308 RTC/NARELLO Act § 4-101 (D) (1979).
309 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 721.26 (5)(b) (West 1970 & Supp. 1983).
310 GA. CODE § 44-3-201(d) (1983).
311 HAWAII REV. STAT. § 514E-12 (1976 & Supp. 1982).
312 NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1726(2) (1981 & Supp. 1982).
313 1983 Nev. Stat. ch. 401, § 48.
314 TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-3 2 -121(g) (1981).
315 VA. CODE § 55-396(2) (1981).
316 1983 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch. 22, § 19 (West).
317 URETSA § 5-105, 7A U.L.A. 304 (1979 & Supp. 1983).
318 RTC/NARELLO Act § 4-101(F) (1979).
319 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 721.26(5)(d) (West Supp. 1982).
320 HAwAII REV. STAT. § 514E-12(b)(1) (Supp. 1982).
321 S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-32-120 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982).
322 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 721.26(5)(d)(2) (West Supp. 1982).
323 GA. CODE § 44-3-202 (1983).
324 HAWAII REV. STAT. § 514E- 11.2 (Supp. 1980).
325 NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1722(3) (1980).
326 1983 Nev. Stat. ch. 401, § 47.
327 VA. CODE § 55-396(G) (1981).
328 URETSA § 5-107(b), 7A U.L.A. 304 (1979 & Supp. 1983).
329 GA. CODE § 44-3-201(c) (1983).
330 HAWAII REV. STAT. § 514E-12(b)(2) (Supp. 1982).
331 NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1726(3) (1980).
332 1983 Nev. Stat. ch. 401, § 20(e).
333 TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-32-121(h) (1982).
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ington,335 URETSA,3 36 and RTC/NARELLO Act 33D;
(9) revoke or suspend registration of developers or sales agents
(Hawaii,3 38  Nebraska, 3 39  Nevada, 3 40  Tennessee, 3 4 1 and
Washington 342);
(10) generally enforce the provisions of the statute (South Caro-
lina 3 4 3); and
(11) assess violations for all reasonable costs of investigation and
prosecution (South Carolina 344).
Some statutes explicitly address the issue of whether time-shares
are to be regulated by the state as a security. For example, the Flor-
ida statute provides that time-sharing plans are not securities.3 45
Conversely, the Tennessee346 and Virginia 347 statutes and the
RTC/NARELLO Act348 exempt from registration under the time-
share statutes any time-share program for which a public offering
statement has been prepared for registration under the state or fed-
eral securities act, or state subdivided land act, or Federal Interstate
Lands Sales Full Disclosure Act.349
C. Information Dzclosure
To protect both the time-share purchaser and non time-share
owners in a project, full and complete information disclosure is im-
portant. Both model acts provide for substantial disclosure to the
purchasers in the form of public offering statements. 350
Similarly a number of states, including Florida,35' Georgia, 35 2
Hawaii,353 Maine,354 Nebraska, 355 Nevada, 35 6 South Carolina,35 7
334 VA. CODE § 55-396(F) (1981).
335 1983 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch. 22, § 10 (West).
336 URETSA § 5-106 7A U.L.A. 304 (1979 & Supp. 1982).
337 RTC/NARELLO Act § 4-101(G)(1979).
338 HAWAII REV. STAT. § 514E-12(b)(2) (Supp. 1982).
339 NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1726(1) (1980).
340 1983 Nev. Stat. ch. 401, § 44.3.
341 TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-32-121(o (1982).
342 1983 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch. 22, § 9 (West).
343 S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-32-130 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982).
344 S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-32-150(d) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982).
345 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 721.23 (West Supp. 1983).
346 TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-32-115 (1982).
347 VA. CODE § 55-395 (1981).
348 RTC/NARELLO Act § 4-107 (1979).
349 15 U.S.C. § 1701-1720 (1976).
350 URETSA § 4-103 7A U.L.A. 290 (1979 & Supp. 1983); RTC/NARELLO Act § 3-101
(1979).
351 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 721.07 (West Supp. 1983).
352 GA. CODE § 44-3-172 (1983).
353 HAWAII REV. STAT. § 514E-9 (Supp. 1982).
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Tennessee,358 Virginia, 359 and Washington, 360 require full and de-
tailed disclosure in their public offering statements. In general the
statements require such information as the developer's name and ad-
dress, unit descriptions, designation of which units are strictly time-
share, projected budgets, disclosure of any required fees, descriptions
of any liens, financing arrangements offered by the developer, cancel-
lation provisions, restraints on numbers of intervals, insurance cover-
age, purchasers' liability for taxation, transfer restrictions, and
expected maintenance fees.
Some of the statutes provide specific exemptions from the disclo-
sure requirements, including:
(1) any transaction pursuant to a court order (Georgia,361 Ha-
waii,362 Nebraska,3 63 Tennessee,364 Virginia, 365 Washington,
366
URETSA, 36 7 and RTC/NARELLO Act3 6 8 );
(2) any disposition by a government or governmental agency
(Georgia,3 6 9 Hawaii, 370 Nebraska, 3 7 1 Tennessee, 3 7 2 Virginia, 3 7 3
Washington,3 7 4 URETSA,3 75 and RTC/NARELLO Act 3 7 6 );
(3) normal hotel operations (Hawaii377);
(4) any gratuitous transfer (Georgia, 378 Hawaii,379 Nebraska, 380
Nevada,38 1 Tennessee,3 8 2 Virginia,38 3 Washington,38 4 URETSA,
38 5
354 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 588 (1982).
355 NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1713 (1981).
356 1983 Nev. Stat. ch. 401, § 37.
357 S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-32-100 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982).
358 TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-32-112 (1982).
359 VA. CODE § 55-374 (1981).
360 1983 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch. 22, § 3.
361 GA. CODE § 44-3-178(b)(2) (1983).
362 HAwAII REV. STAT. 514E-9(b)(1) (Supp. 1982).
363 NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1719(2) (1981).
364 TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-32-126(2) (1982).
365 VA. CODE § 55-395(B)(2) (1981).
366 1983 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch. 22, § 2(3)(c).
367 URETSA § 4-101(b)(2), 7A U.L.A. 289 (1979 & Supp. 1983).
368 RTC/NARELLO Act § 3-105(B)(2) (1979).
369 GA. CODE § 44-3-178(b)(3) (Supp. 1983).
370 HAWAII REV. STAT. 514E-9(b)(2) (Supp. 1982).
371 NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1719(3) (1981).
372 TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-32-126(3) (1982).
373 VA. CODE § 55-395(B)(3) (Supp. 1983).
374 1983 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch. 22, § 2(3)(d) (West).
375 URETSA § 4-101(3) 7A U.L.A. 289 (1979 & Supp. 1983).
376 RTC/NARELLO Act § 3-105(B)(3) (1979).
377 HAwAII REV. STAT. § 514E-9(b)(3) (Supp. 1982).
378 GA. CODE § 44-3-178(b)(6) (Supp. 1983).
379 HAWAII REV. STAT. § 413E-9(b)(4) (Supp. 1982).
380 NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1719(6) (1981).
381 1983 Nev. Stat. ch. 401, § 14(d).
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and RTC/NARELLO Act38 6);
(5) disposition, by foreclosure (Georgia,3 8 7 Nebraska,3 88 Nevada,38 9
Tennessee, 39° Virginia,39 1 URETSA,3 92 and RTC/NARELLO
Act 3 9 3);
(6) disposition of a time-share interval in a time-share project situ-
ated wholly outside the state provided that all solicitations and ne-
gotiations took place wholly outside the state and the contract was
executed wholly outside the state (Georgia,3 94 Nebraska,395 Tennes-
see, 396 Virginia,397 URETSA, 398 and RTC/NARELLO Act3 99);
(7) whenever public disclosure is provided to purchasers under the
Securities Act of 1933 or the Federal Interstate Land Sales Full Dis-
closure Act (Georgia,4 ° Nebraska, 401 Tennessee, 40 2 Virginia,40 3
Washington,4 4 and RTC/NARELLO Act 40 5);
(8) an offering by a developer of time-shares in not more than two
time-share units at any one time (Virginia 40 6 and URETSA40 7, or
not more than one time-share in any twelve month period
(Washington 408 );
(9) any transfer of a time-share unit by an owner of the unit other
than the developer or an agent of the developer (Florida,40 9 Geor-
gia,4 10  Nebraska,4 1I Nevada, 41 2  Tennessee, 4 13 Virginia, 4 14
382 TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-32-126(6) (1982).
383 VA. CODE § 55-395(6) (1983).
384 1983 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch. 22, § 2(3)(e) (West).
385 URETSA § 4-101, 7A U.L.A. 289 (1979 & Supp. 1983).
386 RTC/NARELLO Act § 3-105(B)(6) (1979).
387 GA. CODE § 44-3-178(b)(4) (Supp. 1983).
388 NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1719(4) (1981).
389 1983 Nev. Stat. ch. 401, § 14(c).
390 TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-32-126(4) (1982).
391 VA. CODE § 55-395 (4) (Supp. 1983).
392 URETSA § 4-101(b)(4), 7A U.L.A. 289 (1979 & Supp. 1983).
393 RTC/NARELLO Act § 3-105 (1)(4) (1979).
394 GA. CODE § 44-3-178(b)(5) (1983).
395 NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1719(5) (1981).
396 TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-32-126(5) (1982).
397 VA. CODE § 55-395(B)(5) (1981).
398 URETSA § 4-101(b)(6), 7A U.L.A. 289 (1979 & Supp. 1983).
399 RTC/NARELLO Act § 3-105 (B)(5) (1979).
400 GA. CODE § 434-3-178(a) (1983).
401 NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1718 (1981).
402 TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-32-115 (1982).
403 VA. CODE § 55-395(A) (1981).
404 1983 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch. 22, § 7 (West).
405 RTC/NARELLO Act § 3-105(A) (1979).
406 VA. CODE § 55-395 (1)(9) (1979).
407 URETSA § 4-101(7) 7A U.L.A. 289 (1979 & Supp. 1983).
408 1983 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch., 22, § 2(3) (West).
409 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 721.05(12) (West Supp. 1983).
410 GA. CODE § 44-3-178(b)(1) (1983).
411 NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1719(1) (1981).
412 1983 Nev. Stat. ch. 401, § 14(b).
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URETSA,4 15 and the RTC/NARELLO Act 4 16).
D. Resale of T'ne-Shares
A number of states exempt an owner of a time-share unit who is
not a developer or his agent from the statutory registration require-
ments.417 However, the Virginia statute 4l8 and the URETSA 19 re-
quire the reselling owner to furnish prescribed information to the
new purchaser.
E. Regulation of Sales Activities
In addition to requiring disclosure of information, a number of
statutes regulate the sales and promotional activities of developers
and sales agents.420 Florida and Georgia require that all advertising
materials be filed with the regulatory body within ten days of their
use.42 1 South Carolina requires such materials to be made available
to the Real Estate Commission upon request. 422 No time-share may
be advertised nor offered for sale in Nevada until the advertisement
is approved by the Real Estate Division.423 No person may advertise
a time-share offering in the state of Washington unless a copy of the
advertisement has been filed in the office of the Director of Licensing
at least seven days before publication and has been approved by him
within that time period.42 4
The statutes in Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, and South Carolina
forbid specific sales and advertising practices, 425 and include a broad
prohibition against misrepresentation. For example, the South Caro-
413 TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-32-115(b)(1) (1982).
414 VA. CODE § 55-395(B)(1) (1981).
415 URETSA § 4-101(b)(1) 7A U.L.A. 289 (1979 & Supp. 1983) (to one purchaser).
416 RTC/NARELLO Act § 3-105(B)(1) (1979).
417 See notes 409-16 supra and accompanying text.
418 VA. CODE § 55-380 (1981).
419 URETSA § 4-106 7A U.L.A. 293 (1979 & Supp. 1983).
420 It is interesting to note that neither URETSA nor the RTC/NARELLO Act addresses
the regulation of sales and promotional activities of developers and sales agents. In light of
the alleged fraudulent activities in the FTC v. Paradise Palms Vacation Club, No.
C811160V, (W.D. Wash. Sept. 30, 1981), see notes 206-13 supra and accompanying text, this
type of regulation would appear entirely necessary.
421 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 721.11 (West. 1983); GA. CODE § 44-3-186 (1983).
422 S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-32-20(2) (Law. Co-op Supp. 1982).
423 1983 Nev. Stat. ch. 401, § 53.
424 1983 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch. 22, § 31 (West).
425 FLA STAT. ANN. § 721.11(2) (West Supp. 1983); GA. CODE §§ 44-3-185, 187 (1983);
HAWvAII REV. STAT. §§ 514-11, 11.1 (Supp. 1982); S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-32-110 (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1982).
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lina statute prohibits any act which constitutes fraud, misrepresenta-
tion, or failure to make a disclosure of a material fact. Similarly, the
Hawaii statute prohibits misrepresenting or decepively representing
any material fact concerning a time-share plan or time-share unit.
The Florida statute forbids misrepresenting facts or creating false or
misleading impressions regarding the time-sharing plan. The Ten-
nessee statute implicitly prohibits any developer from engaging in
any unlawful act or practice or disseminating any false or misleading
promotional materials.426 The statutes in Nevada and Washington
also contain broad prohibitions against misrepresentation. 427 Georgia
and Virginia regulate the use of prizes.428
F. Management
The importance of competent management cannot be overem-
phasized. As a recent commentator explained:
Project management is important to any condominium's success.
In a time-sharing project, where the number of individual owners
can exceed 10,000 and where (during the season) there is virtually
100 percent occupancy of each unit by several different owners,
management can make oi break a project very quickly. Without
professional management to ensure routine cleaning and mainte-
nance, the project could rapidly deteriorate. With the number of
owners large and the occupancy periods short, managing a time-
sharing project becomes very similar to managing a hotel.429
States which have simply included time-shares in their condo-
minium acts make no mention of management or maintenance of
individual time-share units. Florida, Georgia, Nebraska, Nevada,
Tennessee, Virginia, URETSA, and the RTC/NARELLO Act have
provisions requiring the developer to establish an entity to manage
and maintain the time-share units. 430 The South Carolina, Hawaii,
and Washington431 statutes mention management and record keep-
ing, but do not specifically provide for the establishment of a man-
agement entity or impose management duties.
426 TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-32-121(0(3) (1982).
427 1983 Nev. Stat. ch. 401, § 52; 1983 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch. 22, § 20 (West).
428 GA. CODE § 44-3-188 (1983); VA. CODE § 55-374.1 (1983).
429 Boster, Marketing the Time-Share Unit, 3 REAL EsT. REV. 104, 108 (Spring 1975).
430 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 721.13 (West Supp. 1983); GA. CODE §§ 44-3-167, 170 (1983);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1711(4) (1981); TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-32-107(4) (1982); VA. CODE
§ 55-371 (1981); URETSA §§ 3-101, 3-106, 7A U.L.A. 275, 279 (1979 & Supp. 1983);
RTC/NARELLO Act § 2-106 (1979).
431 S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-32-30 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 514E-10
(Supp. 1982); 1983 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch. 22, § 3 (West).
[Vol. 59:9]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
G. Transfer of Seller's Interest
The statutes in Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, and the
URETSA,432 contain provisions regulating the transfer of a seller's
interest in a time-share plan. They forbid such a transfer unless the
transferee agrees in writing to (1) honor fully the purchasers' right to
occupy and use the facilities and to cancel their contracts, and (2)
comply with the provision of the statute. Notice must be given to
each purchaser of a time-share unit within thirty days. The Florida
statute also requires the transferee to assume all obligations of the
seller to the purchasers.
H. Penalties
A number of the states impose penalties for violations of the
time-share statute. Criminal penalties are imposed in Georgia (mis-
demeanor), Nebraska (class I misdemeanor), Nevada (misdemeanor),
South Carolina (misdemeanor, fine up to $5,000 for each offense),
Tennessee (misdemeanor, fine up to $5,000 and/or imprisonment up
to one year), Virginia (class 2 misdemeanor), Washington (gross mis-
demeanor or class C felony), and under the RTC/NARELLO Act
(misdemeanor, fine up to $5,000 and/or imprisonment up to one
year).433 Washington provides for a civil penalty not to exceed $2000
for each violation.434 Florida and Hawaii provide for the regulatory
body to impose civil penalties. 435 Hawaii also preserves the state's
right to punish any person for violation of the statute.436
I. Exchange Program
The statutes in Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Nebraska, Nevada,
Virginia, and Washington, as well as URETSA and the
RTC/NARELLO Act,437 require detailed disclosure of information
432 FLA STAT. ANN. § 721.17 (West Supp. 1983); GA. CODE § 44-3-181 (1983); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 27-32-80 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982); URETSA § 3-104, 7A U.L.A. 277 (1979 & Supp.
1983).
433 GA. CODE §§ 44-3-202, 44-3-203 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1722 (1981); 1983 Nev.
Stat. ch. 401, § 51; S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-32-120 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1982); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 66-32-118(b) (1982); VA. CODE § 55-400 (1981); 1983 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch. 22, § 22
(West); RTC/NARELLO Act § 3-108 (1979).
434 1983 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch. 22, § 21 (West).
435 FLA STAT. ANN. § 721.26 (West Supp. 1983); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 514E-12 (Supp.
1982).
436 HAWAII REV. STAT. § 514E-12.5 (Supp. 1982).
437 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 721.18 (West Supp. 1983); GA. CODE § 44-3-172 (1983); HAwAII
REV. STAT. § 514E-9.5 (Supp. 1982); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1714 (1981); 1983 Nev. Stat. ch.
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regarding any exchange programs in which purchasers of time-share
units are permitted or required to participate.
J. Right of Cancellation
A number of states provide the purchasers with an absolute
right to cancel the contract without penalty for a specified period of
time after its execution or the receipt of the public offering statement.
For example, South Carolina provides four days, Hawaii and
Nevada five days, Georgia and Washington seven days, Florida ten
days, and Tennessee fifteen days. 43 8 Virginia provides a limited right
of cancellation for five days if the developer fails to provide the pur-
chaser with the public offering statement five days before signing the
contract. 439 The URETSA has a similar provision but substitutes
seven days for three days.440
Some states give both purchaser and seller the right to cancel.
Nebraska and the RTC/NARELLO Act provide a mutual right to
cancel without penalty for three days, Hawaii for five days, Georgia
for seven days, and Tennessee for fifteen days.44'
K. Purchaser's Remedies
The time-share statutes generally provide purchasers of a time-
share unit with remedies other than cancellation for violations by the
developer or sales agent. In addition to preserving any other remedy
provided by law, the statutes provide for a number of specific reme-
dies. Rescission is explicitly provided as a remedy by Hawaii and
Washington.442 Punitive damages for willful violations are available
under the Georgia and Tennessee statutes as well as the URETSA
and the RTC/NARELLO Act.443 Attorney's fees may be awarded
by the court under the statutes in Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Ne-
401, § 37; VA. CODE § 55-374 (1981); 1983 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch. 22, § 3 (West); URETSA
§ 4-102, 7A U.L.A. 289 (1979 & Supp. 1983); RTC/NARELLO Act § 3-101(B) (1979)..
438 S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-32-50 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982); HAWAii REV. STAT. § 514E-8
(Supp. 1982); 1983 Nev. Stat. ch. 401, § 25; 1983 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch. 22, § 14 (West); GA.
CODE § 44-3-172 (1983); FLA STAT. ANN. § 721.06 (West Supp. 1983); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 66-32-114 (1982).
439 VA. CODE § 55-376 (1981).
440 URETSA § 4-106, 7A U.L.A. 293 (1979 & Supp. 1983).
441 NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1716 (1981); RTC/NARELLO Act § 3-103 (1979); HAwAII
REV. STAT. § 514E-8 (Supp. 1982); GA. CODE § 44-3-174(b) (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-
32-114 (1982).
442 HAWAII REV. STAT. § 514F,-11.3 (Supp. 1982); S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-32-10 (Law. Co-
op. Supp. 1979); 1983 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch. 22, § 23 (West).
443 GA. CODE § 44-3-183 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-32-118 (1982); URETSA § 4-
115, 7A U.L.A. 299 (1979 & Supp. 1983); RTC/NARELLO Act § 3-108 (1979).
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braska, Tennessee, Virginia, and Washington, and under the
URETSA and the RTC/NARELLO Act.44 4
L. Partition
As discussed previously, 445 it is of critical importance in certain
time-share ownership arrangements that the right to partition be re-
stricted. A partition may arise under both the time-span estate and
the interval estate forms of ownership. In the former, the threat of
partition encompasses both the common areas and the separate con-
dominium units. In the latter, only the common elements of the
property are threatened by partition. Under either form of owner-
ship, prohibiting partition is crucial since time-share ownership of a
unit is untenable without the ability to use the common areas. 446
Since the states including time-shares in their condominium acts
only deal with partition of common areas, time-share estates are not
protected unless expressly mentioned in an amended section. Flor-
ida, Georgia, Nebraska, Tennessee, Virginia, URETSA, and the
RTC/NARELLO Act permit the partition of time-share units only
to the extent provided by the time-share instrument. 447 The Hawaii
and South Carolina statutes make no mention of partition.
M. Tort Liabihity
None of the adopted time-share acts specifically addresses the
issue of shielding the time-share estate owner from tort liability.448
Several statutes do, however, require that the management entity
provide comprehensive general liability insurance for death, bodily
injury, and property damage arising out of or in connection with the
use and enjoyment of units by time-share owners, their guests, and
444 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 721.21 (West Supp. 1983); GA. CODE § 44-3-183 (1983); HAWAII
REV. STAT. § 514E- 11.3 (Supp. 1982); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1722 (1981); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 66-32-118 (1982); VA. CODE § 55-382 (1981); 1983 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch. 22, § 21 (West);
URETSA § 4-115, 7A U.L.A. 299 (1979 & Supp. 1983); RTC/NARELLO Act § 3-108
(1979).
445 See notes 30-43 and 94 supra and accompanying text.
446 See Comment, supra note 18, at 432-34.
447 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 721.22 (West Supp. 1983); GA. CODE § 44-3-165(b) (1983); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 76-1712 (1981); TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-32-111 (1982); VA. CODE § 55-372
(1981); URETSA § 2-104, 7A U.L.A. 271 (1979 & Supp. 1983); RTC/NARELLO Act § 2-
107 (1979).
448 See notes 110-15 supra and accompanying text. The three areas of tort liability which
may create problems for time-share owners are liability for injury resulting from negligent
upkeep or design of common areas; liability of co-owners as tenants in common for injury to
third parties on the premises while another owner has the right to possession; and liability of
an owner to co-owners for damage to the unit while he is in possession.
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other users. 44 9
URETSA specifically mentions tort liability. It provides:
(a) A time-share owner is personally liable for his own acts and
omissions and those of his employees and agents other than the
managing entity.
(b) An action may not be maintained against a time-share owner,
nor is a time-share owner precluded from maintaining an action,
merely because he owns a time share or is an officer, director or
member of the association.
(c) An action in tort alleging a wrong done by a developer, a man-
aging entity selected by the developer or his appointees, or an agent
or employee of either, in connection with any portion of the prop-
erty which the developer or his appointees, or an agent or employee
of either, in connection with any portion of the property which the
developer or the managing entity has the responsibility to main-
tain, may not be maintained against the association or any time-
share owner other than a developer. Other actions in tort alleging
a wrong done by an association or by an agent or employee of the
association or by an agent or employee of the association or an ac-
tion arising from a contract made by or on behalf of the association
may be maintained only against the association. If the tort or
breach of contract occurred during any period of developer control,
the developer is subject to liability for all unreimbursed losses suf-
fered by the association or time-share owners as a result, including
costs and reasonable attorney's fees. The operation of any statute
of limitations affecting the right of action of the association or time-
share owners under this section is tolled until the period of devel-
oper control terminates. A time-share owner is not precluded from
maintaining an action contemplated by this subsection because he
is a time-share owner or a member or officer of the association.
(d) A judgment for money against an association [if recorded] [if
docketed] [if (insert other procedure required under state law to
perfect a lien on real property as a result of a judgment)] is a lien
against all of the time shares, but no other property of a time-share
owner is subject to the claims of creditors of the association.
(e) A judgment against the association must be indexed in -the
name of the association.
4 50
Although no state has yet adopted such language in its time-
share statute, these authors believe its inclusion to be highly advisa-
ble so that potential tort liability may be clearly understood by time-
share purchasers and developers.
449 GA. CODE §§ 44-3-167(8), 170(9) (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1708(8) (1980); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 66-32-110(9) (1981); VA. CODE § 55-371(7) (1981); URETSA § 3-108(a)(2), 7A
U.L.A. 280 (1979 & Supp. 1983); RTC/NARELLO Act § 2-106(9) (1979).
450 URETSA § 3-107, 7A U.L.A. 280 (1979 & Supp. 1983).
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N. Lz'ens
Another area of critical importance to time-share estate owners,
and therefore an issue which should be addressed in any time-share
legislation, is responsibility for liens assessed against the time-share
real estate.451 There is clear potential for the forfeiture of a time-
share owner's interest by foreclosure if another time-share owner fails
to pay federal or state taxes.
URETSA and RTC/NARELLO address the two aspects of the
lien issue in remarkably similar fashion. First, the developer is re-
quired, upon transfer of a time-share interest to an owner, to record
or furnish him with releases of all liens affecting that time-share, or
alternatively to provide the him with a surety bond or insurance
against liens in the same manner that the state provides for liens
against real estate.452 Second, if a lien other than a deed of trust
becomes effective against more than one time-share estate, any time-
share owner is entitled to a release of his time-share estate from the
lien upon payment of his proportionate liability.45 3 These provisions
give the owner a measure of security, although they are not entirely
satisfactory.
Most statutes which have been drafted after the two model acts
have adopted their lien language.454 The South Carolina and Ha-
waii statutes, however, enacted prior to the model acts, do not ad-
dress the question. Nevada has taken a unique approach to the lien
issue by requiring that the sale contract for the time-share interest
provide in large bold type that the purchaser is relieved of all obliga-
tions under the contract if his interests are defeated because of fore-
closure of liens against the development. 455 Washington simply
requires disclosure to the purchaser of any liens affecting the
property.456
0. Terminalion of Tz'neshares
It is important to provide for the ultimate disposition of the
property.457 Only the Virginia statute and URETSA provide for ter-
451 See notes 44-61 supra and accompanying text.
452 URETSA § 4-109(a), 7A U.L.A. 295 (1979 & Supp. 1983).
453 URETSA § 4-109(b), 7A U.L.A. 295 (1979 & Supp. 1983).
454 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 721.16 (West Supp. 1983); NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-1721(2)
(1981); GA. CODE § 44-3-180(b) (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-32-117 (1981); VA. CODE
§ 55-381(b) (1981).
455 1983 Nev. Stat. ch. 401, § 28.
456 1983 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch. 22, § 3 (West).
457 See Davis, supra note 29, at 54.
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mination.458 Each specifies detailed termination procedures. The
Virginia statute requires the written agreement of the time-share
owners having at least fifty-one percent of the time-shares, or by such
larger percentage as may be provided for in the time-share instru-
ment. URETSA substitutes eighty percent for fifty-one percent.
V. Recommendations
All states should take prompt steps to enact legislation regulat-
ing the sale and operation of time-sharing. The diverse and inher-
ently confusing nature of time-sharing interests, as well as the
associated marketing techniques, make this type of real estate owner-
ship a fertile area for abuse of purchasers. Consequently, a state
should provide protection both to purchasers of time-shares devel-
oped within the state, and to its citizens who purchase time-shares
located outside the state. It is also in the best interests of developers
that time-shares be regulated to protect them from unfair competi-
tion by unscrupulous developers employing deceptive practices, and
to inspire confidence in potential purchasers. Moreover, the current
regulatory confusion and uncertainty diminishes consumers' accept-
ance of the time-share ownership while increasing the developers'
risks and costs. Accordingly, it is in the public interest that states
regulate through legislation the advertising, offering, sale, operation,
and termination of time-shares. It is further in the public interest
that states adopt a uniform time-share statute so that there will be a
cohesive and consistent body of regulation covering all time-share
estates.
Without [an] "escape" mechanism, the time-shared developer may be creating
a monster. At the end of its economic life, say forty years hence, the underlying real
property will be useless as a vacation facility. It is desirable that the property then
be sold and the proceeds distributed among the various owners of time-shared inter-
ests. Since each of the interval owners has a direct and distinct interest in the prop-
erty, no disposition of the property may be made without consent of all in the
absence of the right to partition.
In a facility containing 100 units, each divided into two-week time periods,
2,500 separate consents would have to be obtained. Of what use is a potentially
valuable piece of property with ownership fractionalized among large numbers of
people, all of whom must agree to any disposition? And if the property may not be
effectively disposed of, the owners will face continuing carrying costs. Many of
them undoubtedly will refuse to pay for unusable property, and the final result will
be a legally tangled and blighted parcel.
458 VA. CODE § 55-373 (1981); URETSA § 2-105, 7A U.L.A. 272 (1979 & Supp. 1983).
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A. General Considerations
In designing the currently needed uniform protective legislation,
the goals of comprehensiveness, clarity, and flexibility should be par-
amount. Otherwise the result will be increased confusion and the
addition of a new set of problems to the existing ones. It is also criti-
cal that regulation of time-shares be placed under a single regulatory
body in order to provide simplicity and regulatory stability. These
objectives and the unique attributes of time-shares require specific
legislation addressed to time-shares, and argue against the adoption
of piecemeal regulation, 459 as well as against attempts to amend ex-
isting condominium or consumer protection legislation as some states
have done.46°
An additional objective is uniformity. The Commissioner's
Prefatory Note to the Uniform Real Estate Time Share Act suggests
a number of advantages to uniform legislation:
Uniform legislation appears desirable for many reasons. Uni-
formity is important to the multi-state purchasers and national
lenders who find it difficult to assess the appropriateness of varying
real estate documents and financing arrangements in several states.
Uniformity is particularly important with regard to time-share
ownership because most real estate time-sharing involves recrea-
tional or resort property, and consequently more multi-state rela-
tionships exist than with other types of real estate. Moreover,
multi-state exchange programs for time-share owners have been in-
troduced and are being rapidly expanded. Consequently, uniform-
ity is especially desirable in view of the fact that a higher
proportion of purchasers in time-share properties is likely to be
from outside the state in which the property is located than in any
other type of real estate sales. The desirability of uniformity will
become even more important as time-sharing, in all of its various
forms, continues to become more widespread and as exchange net-
works become more and more popular. 4
6 1
Absolute uniformity would be achieved through adoption by all
states of the same legislation, although this appears to be unlikely, at
least in the short term. Some degree of relative uniformity may
nonetheless be achieved among states considering the adoption of
time-share legislation if they examine the existing legislation for com-
mon patterns and use them whenever appropriate and desirable.
The statutes of Florida and Hawaii are highly instructive as prece-
dents since these states have had the greatest experience with time-
459 See note 222 supra.
460 See note 224 supra.
461 URESTA, Commissioners'Prefatog Note, 7A U.L.A. 259 (1979 & Supp. 1983).
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shares. The importance of providing complete regulation suggests in
addition a careful scrutiny of the statutes of all those states which
have specifically adopted time-share legislation. These enactments
are invaluable for identifying actual and potential problems that
might otherwise be overlooked.
B. Critical Areas
This article has highlighted a number of the problems associated
with time-shares, but legislation should not be limited to these prob-
lem areas. The statutes and model acts must be scrutinized to iden-
tify other actual and anticipated problems. At the same time it is
desirable that efforts be made to anticipate and address future areas
of confusion before they grow to problematic proportions.
This article has also outlined the current legislative solutions to
these problem areas. It is evident that these solutions share a number
of common features, yet each differs from one another. There is a
rich but coherent pool of alternative solutions upon which a state can
draw. By way of summary, we now outline the minimal set of
problems that require attention and propose guidelines for their solu-
tion in one uniform act.
C. Definition of Time-shares.
Time-shares must be defined broadly to encompass all the ex-
isting forms as well as any new forms that might be developed. It is
better to capture all forms within the regulatory net and then to ex-
empt some specific offerings than to fail to regulate new or variant
forms. Moreover, it is important to validate time-share interests so
that they do not, as presently, act as "traps for the unwary." Atten-
tion should be paid to "definitional exemptions" as well as "transac-
tional exemptions," that is, those based upon the nature of the
offering.
D. Regulatoo, Body
Reducing regulatory confusion, uncertainty, and duplication by
centralizing the regulatory authority in one governing body must be
given high priority. Since time-shares are a form of real property
and are typically sold by real estate agents, a state's real estate licens-
ing board is the logical choice if it is given expanded authority. This
is the approach taken by Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Nebraska, Ne-
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vada, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia.462 So long as ade-
quate provision is made for the disclosure of information and the
prohibition of deception, there should be no need for other state
agencies to regulate time-shares. The regulatory body should be
given sufficient authority and power to issue rules and regulations as
well as to enforce the statute and its rules. It must have sufficient
resources to accomplish these functions. An approach taken by a
number of states, including Florida, Georga, Nevada, South Caro-
lina, Tennessee, Virginia, and Washington, 463 is to impose registra-
tion fees which the regulatory body retains to defray the expenses of
administering and enforcing the time-share statute. Georgia and
Tennessee require that the fees charged and collected be sufficient to
cover the cost of administering the statute.464 Georgia, South Caro-
lina, Tennessee, and Virginia authorize the regulatory body to ac-
cept grants-in-aid from any governmental source and to contract
with agencies charged with similar functions in that state or other
states. 465 South Carolina also authorizes the regulatory commission
to receive grants-in-aid from any private source.466
E. O rings and Sales
It is absolutely essential that adequate and accurate information
be disclosed to prospective purchasers. The current legislation and
the model acts provide a number of satisfactory models. Just as criti-
cal is the prohibition of fraud and other deceptive selling practices;
otherwise, the required disclosures of information through registra-
tion are rendered pointless because purchasers are more likely to rely
upon the seller's advertising and sales pitch than upon detailed and
typically turgid registration statements. Moreover, registration state-
ments are usually examined by purchasers only after the sale, if ever.
Accordingly, it is necessary to provide a period of time in which the
purchaser has an absolute right of cancellation. An explicit right of
462 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 721.05(6) (West Supp. 1983); GA. CODE § 44-3-162(2) (1983); HA-
WAii REX'. STAT. § 514E-1 (Supp.. 1982); NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-1702(2) (1980); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 27-32-10(4) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982); TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-32-102(2) (1981); VA.
CODE § 55-363 (1981).
463 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 721.27 (West Supp. 1983); GA. CODE § 44-3-195(a) (1983); 1983
Nev. Stat. ch. 401, § 36; S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-32-150 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 66-32-123(b) (1981); VA. CODE § 55-392(A) (1981); 1983 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch. 22,
§ 29 (West).
464 GA. CODE § 44-3-195 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-32-123(3) (1981).
465 GA. CODE § 44-3-198(c) (1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-32-160 (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1982); TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-32-121(c) (1981); VA. CODE § 55-396(B)(1981).
466 S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-32-160 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982).
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rescission for fraud should also be granted. Escrow accounts should
be required to cover the return of deposits or the purchase price for
the period of cancellation. The statutes of Florida, Georgia, South
Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia address these issues. 467 Another
alternative is the use of surety bonds, as required by the Florida,
Georgia, and Hawaii statutes. 468 Additional remedies, such as puni-
tive damages, attorney's fees, and criminal penalties should be
considered.
Provisions should be made for transactional exemptions based
upon the nature or type of offering. For example, exemptions should
be provided for gratuitous transfers, dispositions by foreclosure,
whenever public disclosure is provided under the Securities Act of
1933 or the Federal Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, and
transfers of a time-share unit by an owner who is not the developer or
an agent of the developer.
F. Management
It is essential that management and maintenance duties be stat-
utorily imposed. Furthermore, provision should be made for these
statutory duties to extend to parties who acquire the seller's (i.e., the
developer's) interest in the time-share facilities or accommodations.
G. Relations Among Time Share Owners
The various legal issues concerning the relations among time-
share owners need to be addressed. These include, but are not lim-
ited to, tort liability; liability for tax and other liens; the right of
partition; resale of time-share units; exchange expenses and liabili-
ties; voting rights, including the right of initiative, referendum, and
recall; financing time-shares; appraisal of time-shares; and termina-
tion of time-shares. The existing legislation and the model acts deal
in varying ways and extents with these matters. URETSA is the
most comprehensive.
H. Conclusion
Time-sharing promises to keep growing as a segment of the real
estate industry. Consumer and developer protection is necessary to
467 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 721.09 (West Supp. 1983); GA. CODE § 44-3-175 (1983); S.C. CODE
ANN. 27-32-95 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982); TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-32-113 (1981); VA. CODE
§ 55-375 (1981).
468 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 721.08(d) (West Supp. 1983); GA. CODE § 44-3-175(c) (1983); HA-
WvAII REV. STAT. § 514E-10 (Supp. 1980).
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provide the market with attractive alternatives to hotel accommoda-
tions and second-home purchases. Time-sharing must be regulated
in a uniform, thorough, clear, and flexible manner to handle the an-
ticipated volume and problems of the nationwide time-share market.
As evidenced by the current problems and the increasing number of
states enacting statutes, regulation by legislation is the preferred ap-
proach. This regulation should facilitate the growth and success of
time-shares in the real estate industry, and at the same time to pro-
tect the legitimate interests of all interested parties.
